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This dissertation consists of three empirical essays that focus on the intersection of management, gender issues and education. I am interested in finding policy interventions that
promote healthy, efficient and more inclusive workplaces. To do so, I study the micro and behavioral aspects of labor markets using different methodologies. In Chapters 1 and 2, I study
two key features in management, namely mentorship and leadership. Both have an economic
impact on individual employee outcomes as well as organizational performance. I examine
advice giving in mentoring relations in my job market paper and leadership decisions, performance and styles of men and women in another study. Chapter 3 focuses on issues in
education. Choice of major affects career outcomes and income trajectories. Women are less
likely than men to major in quantitatively heavy fields like STEM or economics. I examine
if attitudes of women towards choice of economics as a major are affected by the kind of
information they receive and, in the process, understand their preferences. The leitmotif of
this dissertation is understanding and mitigating gender gaps.
While more than 70 percent of Fortune 500 companies have some type of mentorship
programs, there isn’t much consensus on the design of such programs. Economic research
on the incentives of mentors to give costly advice and matching of mentors and mentees is
underdeveloped and could help firms in understanding and designing better programs. In
the first essay, I investigate under what circumstances would someone perform the job of a
mentor which is providing costly advice to help others. I look at the effect that information
on the ability of mentees and common traits with the matched mentees have on mentors’
v

advice giving. I also explore the presence and channels of gender bias in advice giving. I
employ an incentivized laboratory experiment with a game designed to mimic workplace
mentorship to isolate these key features of mentorship programs. My results show that
mentors are more likely to offer any advice and stronger advice when informed of a common
trait with their mentees. I also find a tendency in mentors to offer advice according to their
own ability and experience instead of tailoring it for their mentees, raising questions about
when advice is helpful and hurtful for mentees.
In the second essay, I explore whether why women may be less likely than men to pursue
top leadership roles. I examine whether the anticipation of worker backlash induces women,
more than men, to select out of top leadership roles and to perform differently when/if they
become leaders. I conduct a novel laboratory experiment that simulates corporate decisionmaking. I find that women are significantly less likely to self-select into a managerial position
when facing the possibility of receiving angry messages from employees. However, once in a
leadership role, women perform no differently than men. I also find that male and female
managers have different leadership styles, i.e. they motivate their employees differently, and
that female managers receive significantly more angry messages from employees.
For every female economics major, today there are almost 2.9 male majors nationwide.
In my third essay, I examine the decisions made by female students to major in economics.
Through a randomized field experiment on the incoming class of female students who had
been offered admission to Dedman College at Southern Methodist University in 2016, I test
the impact of information on women’s decision to major in economics. I investigate what
kind of information matters most and whether the mode of conveyance is important. I
work closely with the SMU Admissions office to implement our email interventions, produce
and direct a short video with female undergraduates to examine the role of peer effects in
disseminating information, use survey data and examine long-term outcomes to understand
the effects of the intervention.
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CHAPTER 1
IT’S A MATCH! OR IS IT? A LAB EXPERIMENT ON MENTORSHIP

1.1. Introduction
Mentorship programs, formal and informal, which broadly comprise career advice, training or serving as a role model provided by more senior workers are pervasive in the workplace.1
Evidence from psychology notes such programs could help with mentee career development
and work attitudes (see Allen et al., 2004 for a meta-analysis) and promote women’s participation and retention in the labor market (Dennehy and Dasgupta, 2017). More than 70
percent of Fortune 500 companies have some type of mentorship programs.2
Formal programs in firms usually assign senior managers as mentors for junior colleagues
(e.g. IBM, Liberty Mutual, Deloitte, General Electric and Boeing), match mentors and
mentees through algorithms (e.g. Toyota, Xerox and ConAgra use a platform called Mentor
Scout) or bring together a pool of potential mentors and mentees and allow self-selection. For
example, Paypal, which purportedly has one of the better corporate mentorship programs,
has for years used an algorithm to match employees with senior staff. However, neither
mentors nor mentees were happy with this setup, leading Paypal to opt for a new model
in 2017 where employees sign up for speed mentoring sessions and try to find a mentor.3
Firms experiment with these different models of mentorship, changing them when they are
unsuccessful, and given these pitfalls, many companies shy away from formal programs alto1

Relationships where mentor and mentee are matched by a third party (e.g. organizational member,
mentoring program staff) and are part of an officially sanctioned mentoring program are typically considered
formal mentoring. Relationships that develop naturally or spontaneously without outside assistance are
considered informal mentoring. (Allen and Eby, 2011)
2

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123301451869117603

3

https://www.wsj.com/articles/employee-mentorship-program-gets-a-reboot-1514376000

1

gether.4 This not only squanders the opportunity for knowledge transfer when people retire
but is also detrimental for women and minorities who are less likely to receive mentorship
and advice though most likely to benefit from them.5
There isn’t much economic research on the design of such programs and understanding
incentives for mentors to give advice and the matching of mentors and mentees better would
benefit firms and employees. While mentorship programs may result in gains for the organization, the mentor has to carve time out of his own schedule and expend energy in giving
advice. Moreover, the mentor often needs to push mentees to do certain activities (for example networking, public presentations of projects, applying for grants, addition to human
capital through competitive exams like the CFA) which mentees themselves are reluctant to
do but which might be pivotal in accelerating their careers.
I capture this idea in my study by modelling the mentoring process as being one where the
mentor has to pay a cost to help the mentee.6 When a mentor has inside information about
the importance of an activity for the mentee’s success but also knows about the aversion
the mentee has against undertaking this activity, would he pay this cost to give advice?
This is my primary research question, one that has not been explored and is an important
contribution to the literature on the design and effectiveness of mentorship programs and
advice giving.
In this paper, I examine under what circumstances would someone perform the job of a
mentor which is paying the cost of providing advice to help others. I look at the effect that
4

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/corporate-mentorship-programs/528927/

5
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-small-business/wp/2017/05/09/why-the-looming-silvertsunami-could-put-25-million-jobs-at-risk/ and LeanIn.Org and McKinsey & Company, Women in the
Workplace 2017 which reports that people with mentors are more likely to get promoted, that women are
24 percent less likely than men to get advice from senior leaders and that 62 percent of women of color say
the lack of an influential mentor holds them back. Also, the 2017 Heidrick & Struggles survey reports that
women and minorities were the most likely to say that the mentoring relationship was extremely important.
6

Apart from time and energy demands, there could be other potential costs to mentoring like being
displaced by successful mentees or viewed as giving unfair advantage to mentees (see Ragins and Scandura,
1999). Of course, there are benefits to mentoring as well, like personal satisfaction, but I abstract away from
this in my study.

2

information on the ability of the mentee and common traits with the matched mentee have
on mentor’s costly advice giving. I also examine gender bias in advice giving. I employ an
incentivized laboratory experiment with a novel game which simulates workplace mentorship and advice giving. In my experiment, the mentor-mentee relationship is as follows: the
main task of the mentor is to advise mentees, who engage in a real effort task, to choose
between two payment schemes to get paid by. One is modelled to mimic the key features
of a competitive payment scheme where the mentees get payment for their performance and
earn a bonus but only if they meet a certain threshold in production. The other is one where
mentees simply get paid for their performance without needing to meet a production threshold requirement or having the opportunity to earn a bonus. By design, mentees are induced
to develop an aversion to choosing the competitive payment scheme. Mentors are aware
of this aversion. Mentors also have some inside information about whether the production
thresholds of the upcoming rounds are achievable or not. This design creates an environment
in which I can examine when mentors help their mentees by offering costly advice, whether
they advise the competitive payment when they see achievable thresholds and whether they
pay higher costs to send higher strengths of recommendation.
One novel element of this design is it allows me to explore the role that information on
common traits in matching play in individuals’ willingness to give advice. I do this by having
a treatment that reveals if mentors have anything in common, or not with their mentees and
another treatment where mentors no longer see the presence or absence of common traits. If
I find that the behavior of mentors, in terms of the willingness to give costly advice, changes
with and without the match characteristics information in these treatments, I can cleanly
attribute it to the provision of such information.
Another novel element of this design is that not only can I identify gender bias in advice,
but also disentangle possible channels causing the bias. Gender bias is often found in the
workplace and could emerge here in the form of mentors giving different advice to male and

3

female mentees.7 I introduce the Chakraborty and Serra (2019) mechanism where I can
reveal the mentee’s gender to the mentor without making it obvious.8 I have a treatment
where mentors know only the gender of the mentee. If I find that in this treatment, mentors
are less likely to give advice or give different kinds of advice to men and women mentees,
there is an indication of gender bias. This is similar to finding women face such a bias in the
field. However, the limitation of field data is it can’t tell us why there is such a gender bias.
There could be multiple channels. This bias may be an explicit one and exist because mentors
think women aren’t as good as men, purely as a prejudice (see taste-based discrimination in
Becker, 1957) or based on ability (see statistical discrimination in Aigner and Cain, 1977). It
is also possible that this an implicit bias say a ‘paternalistic bias’ where mentors are trying to
reflect women’s preferences because they think women don’t like competitive environments
as much as men.9 Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) have provided robust evidence that women
opt for competitive environments far less than men do, even though they are as able as men.
If mentors give less advice to women without information on ability, but as much advice to
both men and women with information on ability, this is evidence of statistical discrimination
where they assume women are of lower ability. If mentors only give less advice to women
and still offer advice to low ability men in the treatments with information on both gender
and ability of mentees, this would be evidence either of taste based discrimination or an
implicit bias, perhaps a ‘paternalistic bias’ due to beliefs about men and women’s liking
for competitive environments. If gender bias exists in advice giving, it is important to find
out why it exists in order to address the issue and find what interventions might solve the
problem. If mentors treat women differently because they don’t realize men and women have
the same ability, then provision of information on ability should correct the bias. If mentors
7

There is strong evidence on gender based discrimination in hiring, promotion and job assignments (see
e.g., Neumark et al. 1996; Riach and Rich 2002)
8

Described in Section 1.2

9

Bertrand et al., (2005) develop a third theory of discrimination suggesting gender biases are automatically activated as soon as evaluators learn the sex of a person leading to unintentional and implicit
discrimination.

4

treat women differently because of taste-based or implicit biases, then training mentors to
recognize and address such biases needs to be incorporated into mentoring programs.
Since mentorship programs are designed and implemented differently in different firms
and each firm has its own specific environment, it is very difficult to address these questions using observational data and field experiments. However, a lab experiment provides
an excellent controlled environment to study such behavior and makes clear identification
on my research questions possible. Moreover, the concept of ”electronic” or ”virtual mentoring” (e-mentoring) has emerged with the growth of internet technology, social media and
online communication.10 For example, LinkedIn provides a platform to connect mentors and
mentees and many workplaces use blended forms of electronic and traditional mentoring.11
This closes the distance between the lab and the field and makes the examination of advice
giving by mentors using a computer technology platform, as designed in my study, useful
and relevant.
My study on mentorship complements and contributes to three strands of literature,
namely advice giving, identity and matching and gender differences. There is an extensive
experimental literature on the effect of naive advice.12 Several lab and field studies have
looked at the effect of expert advice, where advice giving is costless (e.g., Brandts et al.,
2014; Baldiga and Coffman, 2016, Cooper and Kagel, 2016; Blau et al., 2010). Brandts
et al., 2014 find that advice increases high performing women’s entry into tournaments
while reducing that of low performing men. Baldiga and Coffman, 2016 find that giving
a vote of confidence and tying payments of sponsor-sponsees increases men’s willingness to
enter tournaments but not women. However, these studies have not explored under what
10

E-mentoring refers to the process of using electronic means as a primary channel of communication
between mentors and mentees. The key difference between e-mentoring and traditional mentoring being
reflected in the face time between mentors and mentees (Hamilton and Scandura, 2003; Ensher and Murphy,
2007).
11

https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/15/linkedin-rolls-out-its-career-advice-mentoring-program-to-us-ukand-india/
12

Schotter (2003) provides a summary of the effect of uninformed word-of-mouth advice on decision
making and finds even naive advice improves decisions.

5

conditions more informed individuals give advice, especially when it’s costly to do so. With
professional service firms growing in size and complexity, mentorship becomes a key tool to
support and guide young professionals and keep organizations competitive.13 With senior
employees doing more administrative work under greater scrutiny, it becomes essential to
understand if and under what conditions they would be willing to undertake the time and
energy demands to advise mentees and guide them toward career advancement.
The economic literature on identity, matching and mentoring is sparse.14 Ibarra (1992)
demonstrates that the structure of social networks depends on gender and race. Mentoring,
may be more natural and more effective when people share common interests (such as sports),
cultural experiences, language, or when people have significant interactions in a community
outside the workplace. Athey et al., (2000) build a theoretical model and show that ”typebased” mentoring is important and that an employee receives more mentoring when more
upper-level employees have the same type (gender or ethnicity). My study is the first to
experimentally look at whether (and when) mentors opt in to give costly advice and if their
advice giving is different subject to matching on common traits. I identify five different
layers of social identity (gender, origin, hobbies, political inclinations, religiosity) to explore
in the mentor-mentee matches.
My results can be summarized as follows: I find that mentors offer costly advice at least
45 percent of the time, despite there being no clear benefit to mentoring. Conditional on
offering advice, they advise their mentees to enter the competitive environment at least 60
percent of the time. Information about the presence or absence of a common trait with
a mentee has a significant effect on advice giving. Mentors are more likely to offer any
advice and stronger recommendations when informed of a common trait with their mentees
compared to no information. While there are no significant treatment effects due to provision
13

https://hbr.org/2008/01/why-mentoring-matters-in-a-hypercompetitive-world

14

Psychologists and sociologists have documented that mentoring relationships within firms are more
likely to form between members of the same group (e.g., Noe, 1988; Morrison and Van Glinow, 1990; Kanter,
2008)
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of ability information, I find that mentors are significantly more likely to offer advice suitable
for themselves in accordance with their own abilities instead of tailoring it for their mentees.
This is an interesting aspect of mentoring that surfaces unexpectedly in this study. This
might also explain why I don’t find significant evidence of gender bias in advice giving. I
find some indication that giving mentors information about women’s ability might lead them
to advising women against entering the competitive environment and hence work against
women. In the conclusion (Section 1.6), I discuss the policy implications of my findings and
discuss the possibility of future research to explore unexpected results that surface in this
study. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the experiment, and Section 1.3
describes the treatments and hypotheses tested. Section 1.5 provides the data analysis.

1.2 The Mentorship Experiment: Experiment Design
The experiment consists of a short survey followed by 3 active stages (Stages 1 to 3).
Survey
I ask subjects to fill in a brief survey at the very beginning of the session, before Stage
1. The survey is designed to extract five identities that might matter in mentor-mentee
matches namely, gender, geography, political inclinations, religiosity and hobbies.15 The
primary identities I am interested in are gender and geography since firms can easily identify
or solicit this information. However, e-mentoring programs or networking to find mentors
may often use other identities like political inclinations, religiosity and hobbies to match
mentors and mentees. Thus, I also examine the role of these identities in advice giving.
This could help in developing a signaling mechanism where mentees can send a signal of
interest to mentors, facilitating matches in such markets. Coles et al., (2010) find a signaling
mechanism facilitates matches in dating and job markets.
15

I also ask subjects to state how important each of four identities, geography, political inclinations,
religiosity and hobbies are for them to gather their beliefs about these identities.
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I use the Chakraborty and Serra (2019) method to reveal subjects’ genders to other
participants without making gender artificially salient in the game.16 The answer to the
gender question led to a pre-determined list of either male or female names. The male
subjects saw a list of male names and the female subjects saw a list of female names. I
informed subjects that for the duration of the experiment they would be identified with a
fictitious name, and I invited them to pick a name from the gender-specific list they saw on
their screen. I did not allow two or more subjects to choose the same name, so each name
disappeared from the list in real time when picked by another participant. This leads to
each participant being identified by a gendered label but without highlighting gender.
Stage 1 (No Mentoring)
Stage 1 is a pre-mentoring production stage where all subjects engage in 7 rounds of a real
effort task. The task consists of correctly identifying the letters and numbers in a picture. I
call this the ‘Captcha Task’ because it is similar to the Captcha procedure on websites.17 In
my study I wanted a gender-neutral task where men and women would be equally confident
since I am exploring channels of gender bias like discrimination and beliefs where mentors
might give different advice to men and women mentees even when they perform equally well.
I therefore chose a language task, as it has been shown (e.g., Dreber et al., 2014; Niederle
2016) that language-based tasks are less likely than math-based tasks to generate gender
differences in both self-confidence and performance in competitive environments.
In each round of Stage 1 of the experiment, subjects have 4 minutes to solve up to 20
Captchas. In each round, subjects receive 2 ECUs for every correct Captcha plus a 20 ECU
bonus if they meet the production threshold for that round but 0 ECU if they don’t. Even
16

We used Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)’s list of distinctively white sounding names only. Distinctive
names are those that have the highest ratio of frequency in the corresponding racial group. We do not
ask subjects to use their real names as we did not want to lift anonymity nor did we want the potential
confounding bias of race, nationality or ethnicity associated with the actual name of the subject to play a
role in the experiment.
17

This a novel language task that I created using Python and Ztree programming software. I developed
a Python code to generate pictures, containing a mixture of letters (both uppercase and lowercase) and
numbers, of varying lengths and colors. I then incorporated the pictures in Ztree to create the ‘Captcha
Task’.
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though there is no actual competition, this payment scheme is designed to contain the key
features of a tournament.18 Each round has a different number of 6-element (easy) and 8element (hard) pictures for subjects to identify, making some rounds more challenging than
others. Moreover, the level of difficulty is determined randomly for each participant in this
stage.19 I do this to create more variation in individual performance as well as give greater
scope of subjective discretionary behavior on part of mentors when giving advice.
A key feature of this stage is the setting of the production thresholds. Each of the 7 rounds
have a different threshold. The thresholds were set based on performance of participants in a
pilot session of the experiment so I could calibrate to be mostly unachievable.20 The goal is
subjects develop an aversion towards but not complete disillusionment with the competitive
payment scheme. At the end of each of the seven rounds, subjects only learned whether they
successfully met the threshold or not.
At the end of this stage I provide subjects with a history of all 7 rounds showing them
their performance and the required threshold for each. I don’t give feedback about the
exact thresholds between rounds in Stage 1 to prevent learning or formation of beliefs about
thresholds between rounds. At the end of Stage 1, I reveal the exact thresholds to induce the
idea of high (but not unachievable) thresholds and hence an aversion toward the competitive
payment scheme.
At the end of the experiment, two rounds from this Stage are randomly chosen for
payment. Since there is a strong possibility of zero earnings, especially for participants who
faced harder rounds, I select two random rounds for payment to decrease variance in earnings
for subjects.

18

The pre-set thresholds in a sense represent an ’automated’ opponent whose ability I can control.

19

70% of participants face more challenging rounds namely 6 hard and 1 easy round out of the 7 rounds
in this stage. 30% of participants face less challenging rounds namely 3 hard and 3 easy round out of the 7
rounds in this stage.
20

Conducted at UTD prior to the running the main experimental sessions.
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Stage 2 (Mentoring)
At the beginning of Stage 2, half of the subjects are randomly assigned the role of ’Mentor’
and the other half, ’Mentee’.21 They keep their role for the duration of Stage 2.
In this stage, mentees engage in 5 more rounds of the ‘Captcha Task’. However, they
can now choose between two payment schemes to get paid by. Payment Scheme A is the
same competitive payment scheme as in Stage 1. Payment Scheme B is a piece-rate payment
scheme with a payment of 2 ECU for every Captcha correctly solved without any threshold
requirements or bonus earnings. In each round in Stage 2, mentees have to choose between
Payment Scheme A and B to be paid by before they begin the ‘Captcha Task’ for that round.
In each of these 5 rounds, mentees are matched with a different mentor. The matching
algorithm makes sure that a different mentor-mentee pair are randomly matched in each
round.22 Once matched, the algorithm checks for number and kind of characteristics (from
the survey questionnaire) the pair have in common. The matching algorithm is the same
in the three treatments with mentoring (MaxInfo, MedInfo and MinInfo) but only in one of
them (MaxInfo), the match information is revealed to the mentor-mentee pair. The mentormentee pair are told if they share a common trait or not.23
The first key feature of this design is the introduction of the inside information for the
mentors. While the mentee does not know the threshold required in a round to receive
the bonus under Payment Scheme A, the mentor they are matched with is shown a noisy
21

I randomize the assignment of mentors instead of best performers of Stage 1 becoming mentors to get
a good mix of mentors of different abilities and beliefs and avoid ending up with only extreme outcomes in
advice giving. There is a strong likelihood that mentors who are best performers always advocate for the
competitive payment scheme (since they fared well with it in Stage 1) instead of recommending it when
it’s good for the mentees. There is also a strong possibility that such mentors have a disregard for their
mentees (who are mostly of lower ability than themselves) and never advocate the competitive payment for
the mentees. These effects might be more realistic and merit exploring in subsequent studies on mentorship.
22

This random matching algorithm is carefully constructed taking into account information about subject
characteristics from the pilot session at UTD. I checked to see if there were certain characteristics that
occurred more often to create a hierarchy of matches to be displayed but did not find any.
23

If the mentor-mentee pair have multiple characteristics in common, then one of them is randomly
picked to be displayed. Randomizing the information that is displayed allows me more variation to check
how matches affect advice-giving.
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signal (S) about the threshold (T) and is able to provide a recommendation to the mentee
regarding which payment scheme to choose.24 The uncertainty on the threshold corresponds
well with real-life mentoring. The mentor has some imprecise inside information about the
workplace, say promotion criteria. Both mentor and mentee know the ability of the mentee
and the mentor could push the mentee toward the competitive activity (apply for promotion)
through advice. The noisy signal, S, that mentors see is a random draw from the range of
[T-2, T+2].
The second key feature for this stage is the setting of production thresholds. The production thresholds are now set to be more easily attainable. Mentees are not aware of the
lowered thresholds.25
The third key feature of this stage is I ask the mentees to answer a question regarding
their preference for choosing Payment Scheme A over B in between Stages 1 and 2. This
allows me to capture the beliefs (aversion) of the mentees regarding the competitive payment
scheme.26 I can now explicitly reveal to the mentors the beliefs (aversion) of the mentees
toward the competitive payment scheme.27 I do this by showing the mentors the average
answer of mentees to their likelihood of choosing A over B. This is an aggregate measure in
each session. Hence, mentors now see thresholds that are lower on average, hence achievable
more often and that mentees can potentially meet the threshold and earn a high payoff by
choosing Payment Scheme A. However, they also know that mentees have an aversion to
choosing A since they are shown the average answer of mentees to choosing A over B. This
24

I explain how to interpret the signals to the Mentors in instruction handouts (attached in the Appendix)
before the tasks begin.
25
The information about thresholds in the instructions is very carefully constructed to ensure that mentees’
expectations about threshold setting does not change between Stages 1 and 2.
26

The average likelihood of mentees to choose A over B is reported in Table V in the results section.

27
In Stage 1, I take all subjects through the 7 rounds of competitive payment so that in Stage 2, those
who become mentors have first-hand knowledge of the aversion toward the competitive payment. However,
high and low ability subjects may form differing beliefs toward the competitive payment scheme, and this
may inform their advice as mentors. Hence, I explicitly reveal to the mentors the average answer of all
mentees to their likelihood of choosing A over B.
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allows me to examine when mentors help out their mentees and whether information on
ability, match and gender of mentees makes it more likely for mentors to give advice.
Mentors are shown information about their mentee in each round (depending on the
treatment). This is described in Section 1.3. Sending a recommendation is costly for Mentors.
The cost is between 10 and 13 ECU depending on the strength of the recommendation, which
is on a scale from 1 to 4. Mentors get paid a bonus of 10 ECU if the mentee follows their
recommendation of the Payment Scheme. This bonus is based only on whether mentees
follow the recommendation, and not based on the mentees’ final earnings when following the
recommendation.
This scheme of payments is designed to take care of a number of things. In the field, the
net benefit of mentoring may be positive or negative. What I wanted for my study is for the
net benefit of mentoring to be negative in expectation, in order to identify the willingness
to help out others. Giving advice is costly for the mentors but there is a potential benefit
to recoup some of the cost if mentees follow the advice. This might give a reaon for mentees
to not be convinced mentors are giving them the right advice. There is uncertainty on the
mentor’s side regarding how intense (and costly) a signal to send to the mentee since he
doesn’t know the exact threshold and whether the mentee will perform well enough to cross
the threshold and get the bonus. Moreover, the mentee know that the mentor has a noisy
signal about the threshold and that the mentor is paid a bonus based on whether the mentee
follows the advice and hence she doesn’t know whether to trust the mentor’s advice. Hence
there is some tension and uncertainty regarding the giving and accepting of advice which
enables me to see when and how much mentors exert themselves to convince the mentees to
take up A instead of B.
In each round, once mentees see their mentor’s recommendation (if any) and the strength
of the recommendation, they choose payment scheme A or B before beginning the ‘Captcha
Task’. Mentees are not told the threshold during a round, but they are shown a record of
all the thresholds used in each round after the stage is completed. For this stage, for any
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round in which mentees choose Payment Scheme A, if any, they only find out if they met the
threshold after all 5 rounds are concluded. This is done to prevent any updating of beliefs
about thresholds between rounds.
While mentees complete the ‘Captcha Task’, mentors engage in a separate ‘Puzzle-solving
Task’ (a language task developed in Chakraborty and Serra 2019).28 Mentors receive a fixed
wage of 60 ECU per round for engaging in this task regardless of how many puzzles they
solve.29 The ‘Puzzle Task’ serves the dual purpose of giving the mentors something to do
while mentees solve their task (hence preventing fatigue or boredom from affecting advice
giving in subsequent rounds) and allows me to pay them a fixed wage. At the end of
the experiment, two rounds from this Stage is randomly chosen for payment. I select two
random rounds for payment to keep the incentives for choosing Payment scheme A the same
for mentees in both Stages 1 and 2.
Risk Lottery
Stage 3 is a procedure based on the Holt and Laury (2002) mechanism to measure risk
preferences of subjects. All subjects play the lottery individually. They are asked to make
decisions for 10 situations. Each of their choices is a choice between ”Lottery C” and ”Lottery
D”. If they choose Lottery C, they are able to win either 8 ECU or 10 ECU. If they choose
Lottery D, they are able to win either 1 ECU or 20 ECU. For the first choice, each lottery
will give them a 90% chance at the lesser of the prizes and a 10% chance of the better
outcome. Each subsequent choice increases the likelihood of getting the good outcome while
lowering the chance of the bad outcome. At the end of Stage 3 of the experiment, one of
these situations is randomly selected for payment, all situations being equally likely.

28

Each task consists of finding a 4-letter word in a 6x6 matrix. The Mentors have 4 minutes to solve up
to 20 puzzles in each round.
29
A fixed wage prevents a mentor’s performance in the puzzle task from potentially affecting his/her
advice in subsequent rounds and hence creating a confound.
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1.3 Treatments
My experimental treatments are set up to allow me to clearly investigate: 1) the effect
on advice giving of information on ability and common traits in matching; 2) gender bias in
advice giving and decompose the source of the bias and 3) advice taking behavior of mentees.
To this end, I have a four-arm between subject design as detailed in Table 1.1. Subjects fill
out the short survey eliciting gender, geography, political inclinations, religiosity and hobbies.
Then they participate in seven rounds of the ‘Captcha Task’ in Stage 1. This is the same in
all four treatments. Stage 2 is different for the four treatments. In the first three treatments,
T1 (MaxInfo), T2 (MedInfo) and T3 (MinInfo), half of the subjects are randomly assigned
the role of ”Mentor” and the other half, ”Mentee”, at the beginning of Stage 2. In each of
the five rounds of Stage 2, before making a recommendation, the mentors are shown some
information relevant to their decision-making. This information varies between T1, T2 and
T3.
In T1 (MaxInfo), mentors are shown a full set of information, namely the name which
implies gender of the mentee, his/her ability, the signal of the threshold, the average answer
of all mentees to the question they responded to of how likely they are to choose Payment
Scheme A over Payment Scheme B and a common trait shared with the mentee (if any) in
each round.30 Moreover, mentors can be essentially told that they have nothing in common
with their mentee if they don’t share any common traits. (MedInfo) is the same as T1
except mentors are no longer told of the presence, absence or kind of match information
on the mentor-mentee pair in each round. T3 (MinInfo) is the same as T2 except mentors
are no longer see the ability of the mentee in each round. I refer to the fourth treatment
T4 as the Baseline. In this treatment, in Stage 2, all subjects engage in 5 more rounds of
the ‘Captcha Task’. They can choose between Payment Scheme A and Payment Scheme B.
30

Ability of the mentee is measured by average number of Captchas correctly completed by the mentee
in Stage 1.
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There is similar threshold setting and revelation as in the other treatments but no mentoring
or advice.
There is strong experimental evidence that people are not purely self-interested. Prosocial other regarding behavior has been observed in dictator game experiments (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) Models of other regarding behavior posits individuals
derive utility from the material well-being of society (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), from reducing inequality due to inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000) or simply the warm glow of giving (Andreoni, 1990). In my experimental design, advice is costly, and the potential benefits of mentoring are outweighed by the cost. My payoff
structure makes it optimal for mentors to never give advice. However, given strong evidence
that suggests individuals are not purely money-maximizers, I expect mentors to give advice.
Moreover, if mentors care about their mentees, and if information about ability, common
traits and gender of mentee make them care more or less, we might see advice being given
of different kinds and degrees. This leads me to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Costly Advice Giving) Mentors offer costly advice.
If subjects are pure money maximizers, they should never offer advice as mentors since
they either break even or lose money by advising. However, if they do offer advice, it may be
indicative of their trying to help their mentees. If mentors do offer advice, the next question
is, under what conditions do they extend this costly advice? My treatments are designed
specifically to clearly differentiate the importance of different information to a mentor’s
willingness to extend advice. My first research question is to understand the importance of
ability information and match information to a mentoring relation. This leads me to my
second and third hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 (Advice Giving with Ability Information) Mentors are more likely to
offer advice with information on the ability of their mentees than without.
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While MaxInfo and MedInfo provide mentors information on the ability of mentees,
MinInfo does not and a comparison of advice giving in these three treatments allows me to
test if mentors are more likely to give advice with ability information than without.
Hypothesis 3 (Advice Giving with Match Information) Mentors are more likely to
offer advice to mentees with common traits than without.
In the MaxInfo treatment, mentors and mentees receive information on whether they
have a common trait or not. If this information is important to mentors, then we might
see the presence of common traits change the likelihood of the mentor giving advice within
this treatment. In the MedInfo treatment, mentors no longer receive any information on
the presence or absence of common traits. If this information is important to mentors, then
we might see the likelihood of the mentors giving advice change from MaxInfo to MedInfo.
The MaxInfo treatment also allows me to explore if conditional on mentors sharing some
common trait with their mentees, if certain kinds of traits resonate more with mentors and
increase their likelihood of giving advice. The nature of my design provides a richness of
data to check for different components of advice, namely mentors’ likelihood of giving any
advice, their likelihood of giving advice A (competitive payment scheme), their likelihood of
giving the right advice to their mentees and the strength of the recommendation. My second
research question is to identify if there is gender bias in advice giving and if so, what drives
it. This leads me to my fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (Gender Bias in advice) Mentors give different advice to men and women
mentees.
Gender bias could emerge here in the form of mentors giving different advice to male and
female mentees. This can be observed in this experiment by looking at mentors’ likelihood
of offering advice, advice A and the right advice to their men and women mentees. In the
MinInfo treatment, mentors do not get any information on the ability of their mentees.
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If mentors treat men and women mentees differently in terms of the likelihood of giving
advice and kind of advice given, without information on their ability, this would indicate a
gender bias in advice giving. If such a bias exists, there are multiple possible reasons why.
In the MaxInfo and MedInfo treatments, mentors get information on the ability of their
mentees. If mentors give the same advice to men and women mentees with information on
their ability, this would indicate that gender bias in advice giving stems from only statistical
discrimination where mentors don’t believe men and women have the same ability. However,
if mentors give different advice to men and women mentees even with information on their
ability, this could indicate that the gender bias in advice is due to taste based discrimination
or is an implicit bias for example a ‘paternalistic bias’ in mentors’ beliefs where they think
women mentees might not like competition even if they are as able as men. While my
experiment is designed around mentor behavior and is not about mentee behavior, it would
be interesting to examine the way mentees behave with and without advice which allows me
a measure of the importance of mentoring relations. This leads me to my fifth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 (Behavior of Mentees) Mentees behave differently with and without advice.
The Baseline treatment has subjects choosing between Payment Schemes A and B without mentoring. Comparing Baseline with the other treatments allows me to see how mentees
behave with and without advice. If mentees are more likely to choose A with advice, this
is indicative that mentoring relations are important for mentees to make better decisions.
Moreover, I can examine what makes mentees more likely to follow advice, conditional on
receiving it.
1.4 Implementation
I have conducted seven experimental sessions at the Laboratory for Behavioral Operations
and Economics (LBOE) at University of Texas Dallas (UTD). Subjects were recruited using
an online recruitment web site (SONA) maintained by the lab. Participants are all volunteers
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and are drawn from the general student body of UTD including undergraduates and students
from several professional Master’s programs on campus. I involved a total of 192 participants,
of which about 40% are women, as shown in Table 1.1. Each subject participated in only
one session and one treatment.
The experiment consisted of an initial brief survey and name-assignment stage, followed
by three active stages. Subjects were presented with the instructions for each stage on their
computer screen immediately before that stage began. Additionally, at the beginning of
Stage 1, they received hand-outs and verbal instructions about the captcha task, and at
the end of Stage 1 they received further verbal and written instructions (hand-outs) about
the rules applying to Stage 2 of the experiment.31 Two randomly selected rounds from each
Stage 1 and 2 and one decision from Stage 3 of the experiment were used for actual payments.
Experimental earnings were converted from ECUs to dollars at the exchange rate of $1
for 5 ECU. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In order to
guarantee anonymity, at no point during the experiment did I ask subjects to reveal their
names and, although actual names were used during the payment process for accounting
purposes, I informed subjects that I would not register their names and therefore would not
be able to link them to the choices made in the experiment. Most sessions lasted around
an hour and a half to two hours. Subjects were paid in cash. They received $30 in average
earnings including a $5 participation fee. Mentors on average received $35 while Mentees
received $27.
1.5 Experimental Results
Before presenting and discussing my main findings, I will assess performance in the
‘Captcha Task’ in Stage 1 of the experiment. This is to understand how men and women
perform in this task and if there are any gender differences in performance. Table 1.3
reports the average number of captchas correctly solved in Stage 1 of the experiment. Table
1.4 provides panel regressions of performance in Stage 1.
31

Experimental instructions for Stage 1 and Stage 2 (MaxInfo and Baseline) available in the Appendix.
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Overall, women don’t perform as well as men in this task and get fewer successes. These
differences are small (less than 1 captcha per round). This also holds when I include control
dummies for whether it was the last 3 rounds of Stage 1 (Roundlast3 ), whether the individual
was successful in crossing the threshold in the previous round (Successlag ) and treatment
dummies for MaxInfo, MedInfo and MinInfo. The experiment was designed to make certain
that men and women’s performance would be the same so that there would be no reason
for giving different advice to men and women mentees unless mentors have a gender bias.
However, I do find women underperforming slightly meaning there could be justification for
mentors providing different advice to men and women. This makes it important to control
for ability of mentees when testing my hypotheses for gender bias in regression analyses.
Next, I want to assess how likely subjects are to choose Payment Scheme A over B after
Stage 1. This is to understand if subjects were induced to have an aversion to Payment
Scheme A since the thresholds in Stage 1 were designed to be, on average, high. Moreover,
this aversion was meant to be conveyed to mentors through the average answer of mentees
to the question of how likely they were to choose Payment Scheme A over B on a scale of
1-5, 1 being extremely unlikely and 5 being extremely likely. Table 1.5 reports the average
likelihood of mentees (subjects) of choosing A over B on a scale of 1-5 in treatments 1-3
(Treatment 4).32 Overall, the average likelihood of choosing A over B is low in all treatments (between 1.3 and 2.1 out of 5). Regression analysis in Table 1.6 shows there is no
significant difference between men and women in choosing A over B. This means the design
was successful in creating the intended aversion to choosing A over B in Stage 1.
I will now present the results of the experiments by providing a set of summary statistics
of overall advice giving in Table 1.7. Mentors offer advice at least 45 percent of the time.
Conditional on offering advice, they offer advice A at least 61 percent of the time and the
right advice at least 60 percent of the time. I define ‘Right Advice’ for mentees as advising
32

Note, mentors only see the average answer of all mentees to their likelihood of choosing A over B in
each session.
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A if ability ≥ signal and B if ability < signal. The ‘Right Advice’ dummy is 1 if ability ≥
signal and advice is A, or if ability < signal and advice is B and 0 otherwise. Table 1.8 shows
that when mentors give advice, they mostly send recommendations of the lowest cost (Cost
10) followed by recommendations of the highest cost (Cost 14). The decision to give advice
is clearly bimodal, i.e., either mentors give minimum strength or maximum strength advice.
I will not conduct tests on these simple summary statistics as these tests are mis-specified
given the nature of the data. Formal tests of the hypotheses will be conducted using properly
specified regressions but having an understanding of these summary statistics can be helpful
in properly interpreting the regressions.
My first hypothesis posits mentors offer costly advice. Table 1.7 shows that mentors
do indeed offer costly advice at least 45 percent of the time in all treatments, in line with
studies on other-regarding preferences and giving in dictator games. Figure 1.1 shows the
percentage of times mentors offer advice in each treatment. Thus I find in favor of my first
hypothesis.
Result 1 (Costly advice giving) In all treatments with mentoring, mentors choose to
offer costly advice at least 45 percent of the time.
This is indicative that mentors care about helping their mentees. My next hypothesis
examines if advice giving increases with information on mentees’ ability. Table 1.9 contains
a set of random effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject levels.
I report estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if mentors give
advice (Col. 1), give advice A, conditional on giving advice (Col. 2), give the right advice,
conditional on giving advice (Col. 3) and give stronger advice (Col. 4) and 0 otherwise. I
control for individual characteristics of the mentor which could affect his/her advice giving
like gender (Female), number of times they met the threshold in Stage 1 (Stage 1 Successes),
risk aversion and whether the mentor gave the advice that was right for himself/herself
(Right Advicementor ).33 The ‘Right Advicementor ’ dummy is 1 if mentor’s ability ≥ signal and
33

Risk aversion is measured by the number of times subjects chose the safe option, Option 2, in Stage 3.
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advice is A, or if mentor’s ability < signal and advice is B and 0 otherwise. I also control
for information that mentors get across all three treatments, namely the gender of their
mentee (Female Mentee), the signal of the threshold (Signal) and the average likelihood of
mentees’ choosing A over B (LikelyA). I find there are no significant treatment effects on
the likelihood to give advice or the kind of advice given. Thus, I reject this hypothesis.
Result 2 (Advice Giving with Ability Information) There is no significant difference
in advice giving with and without information on ability of mentees.
While there are no treatment effects, I find that mentors are significantly more likely to
give the right advice to their mentees when it is the right advice for themselves (p-value
0.000). For most of the advice giving in MaxInfo and MedInfo (where mentors can see the
ability of their mentees), the interest of the mentor and the mentee are aligned i.e. the right
advice for the mentees is the same as the right advice for the mentors themselves.34 However,
in the ‘conflict cases’ comprising 34% of advice giving, right advice for mentors is different
from right advice for mentees. In 72% of the conflict cases, mentors give the advice to their
mentees that is wrong for the mentees, but right for themselves while in only 28% of the
conflict cases, mentors give advice that is right for the mentees, while wrong for themselves.
This suggests a possible explanation for why I don’t find differences in advice giving with
and without ability information. Mentors seem to be advising their mentees based on their
own ability rather than the mentee’s ability. This is an interesting aspect of mentoring that
surfaces unexpectedly in this study. It shows a tendency in mentors to offer advice suitable
for themselves instead of tailoring it to the needs of their mentees.
My next hypothesis deals with the importance of having common traits to advice giving.
I examine if mentors are more likely to give advice with information on common traits and
if they give different information depending on the trait. My next results find in favor of
these hypotheses.
34

Mentors give the right advice to their mentees 62% of the time. Out of this, 85% of the time, their
interest and their mentees’ interest align.
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In MaxInfo, mentors get information on the presence (or absence) of common traits with
their mentees and the kind of trait, when matched with a mentee. Table 1.10 gives summary
statistics of distribution of traits within this treatment. Figure 1.2 shows mentors are more
likely to offer advice to mentees they share a common trait with than mentees they don’t
have anything in common with. This is confirmed in regression analysis in Table 1.12, where
within Treatment 1, information about a common trait significantly increases the likelihood
to give advice (see the estimated coefficient and p-value obtained for Common Trait in Col
1). Further, this finding is confirmed in regression analysis in Table 1.9 when looking at
mentors’ likelihood to give advice with or without a match. The estimates in Col 1 in
particular confirm that mentors are significantly more likely to give advice with information
of a match (see the estimated coefficient and p-value obtained for MaxInfoxCommon in Col
1) or without being informed of presence or absence of matches at all (see the estimated
coefficient and p-value obtained for MedInfo in Col 1) than with information of no match.
In these regressions, I control for individual mentor characteristics like gender, number of
successes in Stage 1, risk aversion and whether the mentor gave the advice that was right for
himself/herself. Mentors get mentee’s ability information as well the signal of the threshold. I
use the absolute difference between the mentee’s ability and the signal (|Abilitymentee -Signal|)
as a control in the likelihood of giving advice, the right advice and the strength of advice. I
use the relative difference between the mentee’s ability and the signal (Abilitymentee -Signal)
as a control in the likelihood of giving advice A.
I also examine if particular kinds of traits work better in eliciting advice from mentors.
I look at gender matches (Matchgender ), matches on geography (Matchgeography ) and matches
on political inclinations (Matchpolitics ) since these are the most frequent. Regression analysis
in Table 1.13 shows a gender match between mentors and mentees increases the likelihood
of giving advice A and the right advice and a match on political inclinations increases the
likelihood of mentors giving advice A. I summarize these findings as follows:
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Result 3 (Advice Giving with Match Information) The presence of common traits significantly increases advice giving for mentors. They are significantly more likely to offer any
advice when sharing a common trait with their mentees than when they are informed of having nothing in common with their mentees. A gender match between mentors and mentees
increases the likelihood of giving advice A and the right advice and a match on political
inclinations increases the likelihood of mentors giving advice A.
I now turn to examining gender bias in advice towards men and women mentees. My
design allows me to not only see if gender bias exists but also to identify possible channels causing it. The first is explicit statistical discrimination where mentors simply treat
men and women mentees differently because they don’t believe women are as good as men.
This is captured by mentor behavior in MinInfo where mentors don’t know the ability of
their mentees. Other channels could be discrimination in the form of a ‘paternalistic bias’
where mentors don’t believe women like competition as much as men even if they have the
same ability as men or pure taste-based discrimination against women. This is captured by
comparing gender bias in MinInfo with MedInfo and MaxInfo. I first examine if mentors
treat men and women differently with no information on their ability. I conduct a series of
random effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level with the
dependent variable being mentors giving advice and the kind and strength of advice given
and the independent variables being individual characteristics and treatment specific information provided to mentors. Table 1.14 shows the following: there is no significant gender
bias in terms of giving any advice or advice A to male or female mentees. However, women
mentees are significantly less likely to get stronger recommendations without information on
their ability (MinInfo). This seems to be mostly driven by women mentors giving weaker
recommendations to women mentees.
Next, I examine if mentors treat men and women mentees differently even with information on their ability. Providing information on ability appears to remove the gender bias in
strength of recommendations with women getting the same degree of push as men (shown
23

in Table 1.16). With information on ability in MedInfo, female mentees are less likely to get
advice A, even after controlling for the difference between the ability and signal information
mentors see (reported in Table 1.15). However, this result disappears when pooling MaxInfo
and MedInfo (reported in Table 1.16) both of which have information on ability. Hence, I
don’t find significant evidence for gender bias in advice for mentees. It is possible that this
design fails to capture the full extent of gender bias in advice due to the tendency of mentors
to give advice in accordance with their own instead of mentees’ ability or even gender, as
noted earlier.
Result 4 (Gender Bias in advice) Mentors give as much advice to women as men mentees
with or without information about mentees.
The general indication is that despite expectations, men and women aren’t being treated
very differently by mentors.There is one treatment (MedInfo), in which mentors know the
ability of the mentee along with the gender, where there is some indication that women are
less likely to be told to enter the competition. It might be that providing information about
ability to mentors works against women because it gives mentors a plausible excuse to tell
women not to enter the competition. They can attribute their advice to the ability and
not the gender, even though they interpret the ability of men and women differently. This
channel of gender bias might especially surface in my design since mentors provide advice
to men and women at separate intervals and any specific mentor might never encounter a
man and a woman mentee with the exact same ability. However, I don’t find women being
told to enter competition less in MaxInfo where plausibly this channel might also exist since
mentors know ability, along with the gender and the match information. So, I don’t have
strong evidence in favor of this channel of gender bias. This suggests future studies should
explore this channel since this experiment was not designed to provide any insights into it.
In addition to the main questions about behavior of mentors and advice giving, it is
also useful to examine is the behavior of mentees. I examine whether mentees choose the
competitive payment scheme A more with advice than without. I find that subjects are
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significantly more likely to choose A when given advice A. Figure 1.3 shows mentees choose
A only 15 percent of the time without being advised A but this number goes up to 55 percent
when given advice A. I conduct a series of random effects panel regressions with standard
errors clustered at the subject level and the dependent variable being mentees (or subjects
in Baseline) choosing A in Stage 2. The regression table 1.17 shows an increase in mentee’s
likelihood of choosing A comes from being given advice A. Also, a significant predictor of
choosing A are the Number of Successes in Stage 1.
Last, I look at whether mentees follow the advice they were given. I conduct a series
of random effects panel regressions with standard errors clustered at the subject level and
the dependent variable being mentees following advice. The regression table 1.18 shows no
significant difference in advice following between treatments. The strength of advice given is
a significant predictor of mentees following advice as is their own risk aversion. On average,
mentored mentees achieve earnings of $27.06 in MaxInfo, $25.94 in MedInfo, and $30.3 in
MinInfo while non-mentored mentees achieve earnings of $32.48 in Baseline. This seems to
be an indication that mentors might be hurting more than helping the mentees with their
advice. This experiment was not designed to determine if mentors actually helped mentees
since mentees get an updated belief about thresholds when given advice and there is an
endogeneity in mentees following advice. Recommendation in this experiment takes the
simple form of mentors suggesting between alternative payment schemes to mentees on a
first name basis. However, this finding makes it important to explore whether advice helps
or hurts mentees in subsequent studies.
I summarize these findings as follows:
Result 5 (Behavior of Mentees) Subjects are more likely to choosing the competitive
payment A with advised A. They are more likely to follow stronger advice.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this study, I use controlled experiments to simulate real-life situations of mentoring.
I examine when someone would perform the job of a mentor and pay a cost to help their
mentees, particularly with regard to pushing them into a competitive but high paying environment knowing they have an aversion to it. My experiment is designed to simultaneously
test for key facets of mentoring, namely the importance of information on abilty and common
traits to the likelihood of advice giving and the identification and decomposition of gender
bias in advice.
My results provide useful insights into advice giving and the design of mentorship programs. I find that while information on mentees’ ability does not change advice giving,
information about the presence or absence of a common trait with a mentee has a significant
effect on advice giving. Mentors are more likely to offer any advice when informed of a
common trait with their mentees. They are also significantly more likely to provide advice
to mentees when they are not informed of presence or absence of common traits than when
they are informed of no common traits. A match based on gender or political inclinations
between mentors and mentees increases the likelihood of them advising mentees to enter the
competitive environment. This has important policy applications for mentoring programs.
Depending on the structure of mentoring programs of firms, mentees should be matched on
some common trait solicited by the mentoring program. It is important for mentors to have
something in common with their mentees. Firms should conduct team building exercises for
mentor-mentee pairs to develop this sense of kinship if they have nothing in common from
the solicited characteristics.
Some unexpected results open up new avenues in mentorship for further discussion and
study. I expected treatment effects on advice giving due to different information available
on ability of mentees and this doesn’t seem to matter. A compelling possible explanation is
that mentors are giving advice in accordance with their own ability, which is not changing
across treatments. This sets up questions about whether mentors are behaving correctly.
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Should they be basing advice on their own ability and experience or should they be tailoring
their advice to suit their mentees’ abilities? On the one hand, bad advice defeats the purpose
of mentoring relations, leading mentees down unsuitable or unprofitable career paths. On
the other hand, mentors often need to guide mentees into competitive situations and tasks
for their career advancement. Mentors inducing overconfidence in their mentees may be
beneficial to the mentees in the long run.35 Indeed my findings show mentees undertake the
competitive payment scheme significantly more with advice than without. However, given
the correlation between mentee and mentor ability in my study, it’s not clear which effect is
more likely.
Mentors giving advice suitable for themselves might be a reason I do not find sufficient
evidence on the questions on gender bias in advice giving I set out to answer. In this
framework where mentors don’t benefit from giving advice, telling mentees what the mentors
themselves would do might be a simple way to bypass the ethical issues raised by giving
advice based on a host of information on mentee charactersitics. I do find some indication
of an entirely different channel of gender bias. Giving mentors information about womens’
ability may give them a plausible reason to justify subjectivity and advise women to enter the
competitive environment less than men. This raises an interesting question. Does providing
information on a woman’s ability further gender bias by giving license to treat her differently?
Is it the case that women are held to a higher standard than men, despite knowledge of their
abilities, because evaluators doubt how the women got there (perhaps faced easier tasks than
themselves)? Reuben et al., (2014) find in a lab experiment that providing information about
candidates’ past performance reduces employer bias against women but does not eliminate
it. Player et al., (2019) find in a psychology study of leadership that men are judged more
on their potential while women are judged more on their performance. Hengel (2017) finds
evaluators apply higher standards to women’s writing in academic peer review. Future work
35

Men’s overconfidence is a primary determinant of their excessive participation in competition leading
to professional opportunities that offer higher incomes (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, 2010; Gneezy et al.,
2003).
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could explore these features of advice giving and gender bias that surface in this study on
mentorship.
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Table 1.1: Treatments
Mentor
MaxInfo (T1)
Yes
MedInfo (T2)
Yes
MinInfo (T3)
Yes
Baseline (T4)
No

Gender
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Threshold Signal
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Ability
Yes
Yes
No
No

Match
Yes
No
No
No

Table 1.2: Sessions
Subjects
MaxInfo (T1)
48
MedInfo (T2)
54
MinInfo (T3)
60
Baseline (T4)
30
Total
192

Mentors
24
27
30

Mentees
24
27
30

81

81

Table 1.3: Average number of correctly solved captchas in Stage 1.
Total
MaxInfo (T1) 11.06
MedInfo (T2) 12.12
MinInfo (T3) 11.75
Baseline (T4) 11.01
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Men Women
11.20 10.87
12.38 11.51
12.12 11.07
11.24 10.76

Table 1.4: Performance in Stage 1.

Female

(1)
P
-0.822∗∗∗

(2)
P
∗∗∗
-0.829

(3)
P
-0.729∗∗

(4)
S
-0.047∗∗

(5)
S
∗∗
-0.070

(6)
S
-0.062∗∗

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.013)

(0.042)

(0.012)

(0.028)

∗∗∗

Roundlast3

0.744

(0.000)

Successlag

∗∗∗

-0.739

-0.136

(0.683)

(0.499)

MedInfo
MinInfo

-0.148

(0.000)

-0.084

MaxInfo

∗∗∗

(0.000)

-0.199

∗∗∗

(0.000)

Constant
Observations
R-Squared

11.872

∗∗∗

11.917

(0.000)

-0.203∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.141

0.040

(0.759)

(0.328)

1.020∗∗

0.100∗∗

(0.015)

(0.013)

0.718∗

0.065∗

(0.066)
∗∗∗

-0.148∗∗∗

∗∗∗

11.354

(0.077)
∗∗∗

0.311

∗∗∗

0.487

0.427∗∗∗

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

1344
0.014

1152
0.030

1152
0.045

1344
0.002

1152
0.063

1152
0.068

Panel regressions. Dependent variable: Col (1)-(3): Number of correctly solved captchas,
Col (4)-(6): Success (1-met threshold, 0-didn’t meet threshold). Controls: dummy for last
3 rounds of Stage 1 (Roundlast3 ), success in crossing the threshold in the previous round
(Successlag ) and treatment dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
p-values are reported in parentheses. There are 192 participants. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Average likelihood of choosing payment scheme A over B.
Total
MaxInfo (T1)
1.8
MedInfo (T2)
2.1
MinInfo (T3)
1.7
Baseline (T4)
1.3

Men
1.5
2.42
2.13
1.19

Women
2.2
1.25
1.36
1.36

The likelihood is measured on a scale of 1-5
where 1 is ‘Extremely unlikely to choose A’
and 5 is ‘Extremely likely to choose A’.

Table 1.6: Likelihood of choosing A over B on a scale of 1-5.

Female

(1)
-0.362

(2)
-0.150

(3)
-0.109

(0.131)

(0.556)

(0.664)

Stage 1 Successes

0.603

Risk Aversion

∗∗∗

0.596∗∗∗

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.010

0.024

(0.867)

(0.700)

MaxInfo

0.721
(0.126)

0.869∗

MedInfo

(0.051)

MinInfo

0.594
(0.194)

Observations

111

111

111

Probit regressions. Dependent variable: Likelihood of
choosing A over B in Stage 2. p-values are reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Percentage of times mentors offer advice in each treatment.
Advice (%)
MaxInfo (T1)
45
MedInfo (T2)
55.6
MinInfo (T3)
46

Advice A (%)
61.11
65.33
65.22

Right Advice (%)
62.96
60.00
69.57

Table 1.8: Percentage of mentors who give different strength of advice by treatment.
Strength 1

Strength 2

Strength 3

Strength 4

(Cost 10)

(Cost 11)

(Cost 12)

(Cost 13)

3.33
4.44
3.33

6.67
8.89
2.00

8.33
22.22
13.33

MaxInfo (T1) 26.67
MedInfo (T2) 20.00
MinInfo (T3) 27.33

32

Table 1.9: Regression Analysis of likelihood of giving advice over all three treatments

MaxInfo
MedInfo
Female
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion
Female Mentee
Signal
LikelyA

(1)
Any Advice
-0.048

(2)
Advice A
-0.015

(3)
Right Advicementee
-0.080

(4)
Strong Advice
-0.058

(0.596)

(0.891)

(0.507)

(0.876)

0.058

0.018

-0.116

0.497

(0.595)

(0.876)

(0.265)

(0.171)

0.106

0.080

0.008

-0.476∗

(0.156)

(0.352)

(0.940)

(0.092)

0.002

0.105∗∗∗

0.049

-0.237∗

(0.952)

(0.008)

(0.228)

(0.073)

-0.008

-0.044∗

-0.012

-0.002

(0.726)

(0.085)

(0.533)

(0.969)

0.028

-0.071

-0.038

0.065

(0.613)

(0.321)

(0.635)

(0.690)

0.056∗∗∗

-0.058∗∗

-0.064∗∗∗

0.035

(0.000)

(0.012)

(0.004)

(0.443)

0.051

0.059
(0.681)

-0.069
(0.641)
0.465∗∗∗

0.293
(0.526)

(0.707)

Right Advicementor

(0.000)

Observations

405

198

198

198

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4)
conditional on giving advice. Right Advicementor dummy is 1 if mentor’s ability≥signal
and advice is A, or if mentor’s ability<signal and advice is B and 0 otherwise. LikelyA is
the average answer of mentees’ likelihood of choosing A over B that is reported to the mentors.
Stage 1 Succesesmentor is the number of succeses the mentor had in Stage 1.
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Table 1.10: Distribution of match characteristics in MaxInfo.
Total (%) Men (%)
Nothing common 25.83
21.43
Geography
32.50
35.71
Politics
17.50
20.00
Religion
13.33
10.00
Hobbies
10.83
12.86
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Women (%)
32.00
28.00
14.00
18.00
8.00

Table 1.11: Regression Analysis of likelihood of giving advice with common traits

Common Trait
Female
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion

(1)
Any Advice
0.299∗∗∗

(2)
Advice A
0.160

(3)
Right Advicementee
-0.024

(4)
Strong Advice
0.207

(0.005)

(0.461)

(0.859)

(0.642)

0.198

-0.719

-0.132

0.056

(0.128)

(0.201)

(0.229)

(0.927)

-0.009

∗∗

0.176

-0.032

0.008

(0.850)

(0.041)

(0.642)

(0.977)

0.000

-0.063∗∗∗

-0.017

-0.140

(0.985)

(0.037)

(0.419)

(0.237)

0.735∗

Right Advicementor

(0.054)

Female Mentee

0.043

0.250

0.078

-0.251

(0.683)

LikelyA

-0.523

(0.115)

(0.639)

(0.355)

-2.240

-4.841∗∗∗

4.947

(0.695)

(0.187)

|Abilitymentee -Signal|

-0.009
(0.728)

(0.005)

(0.393)

0.735∗

-0.004
(0.966)

(0.054)
∗∗∗

Abilitymentee ≥Signal

0.123

(0.001)

Abilitymentee -Signal

0.193
(0.517)

Observations

120

54

54

54

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4)
conditional on giving advice. Common trait dummy is 1 if mentor-mentee share a common trait
and 0 otherwise. Right Advicementor dummy is 1 if mentor’s ability≥signal and advice is A, or
if mentor’s ability<signal and advice is B and 0 otherwise.
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Table 1.12: Regression Analysis of likelihood of giving advice with and without information
of common traits

MedInfo
MaxInfoxCommon

(1)
Any Advice
0.393∗∗∗

(2)
Advice A
0.173

(3)
Right Advicementee
-0.027

(4)
Strong Advice
0.749

(0.000)

(0.383)

(0.877)

(0.172)

0.196

0.056

-0.011

(0.254)

(0.697)

(0.980)

0.026
(0.018)
-0.015

0.070
(0.498)
0.060

-0.027
(0.820)
0.022

-0.246
-0.327∗∗

(0.697)

(0.153)

(0.676)

(0.032)

0.011

-0.065∗∗∗

-0.056

-0.010

(0.629)

(0.007)

(0.039)

(0.891)

∗∗∗

0.317

(0.004)

Female
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion

∗∗∗

(0.470)

0.329∗∗

Right Advicementor

(0.022)

Female Mentee
|Abilitymentee -Signal|

0.063

-0.090

-0.044

0.028

(0.366)

(0.324)

(0.711)

(0.893)

∗∗∗

-0.022

0.124

(0.212)

(0.000)

Abilitymentee ≥Signal

0.062

0.008
(0.887)

∗∗∗

(0.000)

Abilitymentee -Signal

0.083
(0.523)

MaxInfoxCommon-MedInfo=0
Observations

-.205
(0.374)
255

.093
(0.722 )
129

.231
(0.448 )
129

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4)
conditional on giving advice.
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∗

-.387
(0.081)
129

Table 1.13: Regression Analysis of likelihood of giving advice by types of traits

Matchgender
Matchgeography
Matchpolitics
Female

(1)
Any Advice
0.091

(2)
Advice A
0.328∗

(3)
Right Advicementee
0.339∗

(4)
Strong Advice
-0.257

(0.443)

(0.087)

(0.076)

(0.463)

-0.025

-0.041

-0.013

0.534

(0.857)

(0.819)

(0.936)

(0.336)

-0.063

∗

0.267

0.191

0.432

(0.677)

(0.095)

(0.315)

(0.385)

0.061

-0.138

-0.297

∗

0.166

(0.699)

(0.383)

(0.074)

(0.791)

0.723∗∗∗

Right Advicementor

(0.000)

Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion
Female Mentee
|Abilitymentee -Signal|

-0.021

∗∗

0.257

-0.099

-0.036

(0.695)

(0.018)

(0.163)

(0.891)

-0.028

-0.087

0.002

∗∗∗

-0.074

(0.946)

(0.010)

(0.109)

(0.464)

0.020

0.250

0.035

-0.251

(0.846)

(0.115)

(0.837)

(0.395)

∗∗∗

0.009

0.271

(0.773)

-0.046

(0.000)

(0.690)

46

46

∗∗∗

Abilitymentee ≥Signal

0.123

(0.001)

0.157∗∗∗

Abilitymentee -Signal

(0.001)

Observations

89

46

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4), conditional
on giving advice.
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Table 1.14: Regression Analysis of giving advice without ability information (T3).

Female Mentee
Female
Matchgender
Signal
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion
Observations

(1)
Any Advice
0.026

(2)
Advice A
-0.034

(3)
Strong Advice
-2.122∗∗∗

(0.838)

(0.816)

(0.000)

-0.072

0.076

-3.661∗∗∗

(0.601)

(0.543)

(0.000)

0.139

-0.045

-2.344∗∗∗

(0.257)

(0.739)

(0.000)

∗∗

-0.033

0.083

(0.017)

(0.460)

(0.438)

0.089

0.384∗∗

0.518

(0.263)

(0.004)

(0.267)

-0.024

-0.042

0.008

(0.518)

(0.280)

(0.926)

150

69

69

0.056

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving strong advice
(strength=4), conditional on giving advice.
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Table 1.15: Regression Analysis of giving advice with ability information (T2).

Female Mentee
Female
Matchgender
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion
|Abilitymentee -Signal|

(1)
Any Advice
0.108

(2)
Advice A
-0.313∗∗∗

(3)
Right Advicementee
-0.027

(4)
Strong Advice
0.106

(0.336)

(0.004)

(0.863)

(0.742)

∗∗

∗

∗∗

0.233

0.262

0.259

-0.559

(0.041)

(0.060)

(0.039)

(0.175)

0.016

-0.074

-0.122

-0.278

(0.886)

(0.453)

(0.320)

(0.333)

-0.024

0.060

0.058

-0.538∗∗∗

(0.698)

(0.304)

(0.266)

(0.001)

0.033

-0.089

-0.065

-0.016

(0.469)

(0.108)

(0.257)

(0.896)

-0.009

∗∗

0.083

0.023

(0.728)

(0.042)

(0.760)

75

75

Abilitymentee -Signal

0.012
(0.586)

Observations

135

75

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4) conditional
on giving advice.
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Table 1.16: Regression Analysis of giving advice with ability information (T1 and T2).

Female Mentee
Female
Matchgender
Stage 1 Successesmentor
Risk Aversion

(1)
Any Advice
0.048

(2)
Advice A
-0.093

(3)
Right Advicementee
-0.072

(4)
Strong Advice
-0.086

(0.510)

(0.318)

(0.519)

(0.674)

∗

0.042

0.009

-0.346

(0.096)

(0.688)

(0.940)

(0.343)

0.164

0.000

-0.010

-0.087

-0.315

(0.996)

(0.917)

(0.432)

(0.118)

-0.000

0.056

0.034

-0.263∗

(0.999)

(0.173)

(0.461)

(0.055)

0.017
(0.531)

|Abilitymentee -Signal|

∗∗

-0.063

(0.005)

∗∗∗

-0.063

(0.023)
∗∗∗

-0.017

0.115

(0.312)

0.018
(0.826)

0.016

(0.000)

(0.759)

129

129

∗∗∗

Abilitymentee -Signal

0.061

(0.000)

Observations

255

129

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Standard errors are clustered on the individual.
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) is giving any advice,
Col (2) is giving advice A, conditional on giving advice, Col (3) is giving the right advice to
the mentee, conditional on giving advice and col (4) is giving strong advice (strength=4), conditional
on giving advice.
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Table 1.17: Regression Analysis of mentees choosing A
(1)
Choose A
0.420∗∗∗

(2)
Choose A
0.412∗∗∗

(0.000)

(0.000)

Given any advice

-0.236

-0.237

(0.156)

(0.148)

MaxInfo

-0.206

-0.204

(0.156)

(0.148)

Given Advice A

MedInfo
MinInfo

0.227∗

0.163

(0.054)

(0.142)

0.118

0.127

(0.316)

(0.240)

Female

0.052
(0.557)

0.117∗∗∗

Stage 1 Successes

(0.001)

Risk Aversion

-0.032
(0.155)

Observations

273

273

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Dependent
variable: Mentee chooses A.Robust pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.18: Regression Analysis of mentees following advice

MaxInfo
MedInfo

(1)
Follow Advice
0.038

(2)
Follow Advice
0.031

(0.710)

(0.757)

0.110

0.050

(0.170)

(0.573)

Female

0.096
(0.225)

Stage 1 Successes

-0.012
(0.678)

-0.041∗∗

Risk Aversion

(0.022)

Strength of Advice
Observations

198

0.070∗∗∗
0.009
198

Estimates generated by probit regressions. Dependent
variable: Mentee follows Advice. Robust pval in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.1: % times mentors offer advice in each treatment.

Figure 1.2: % times mentors offer advice with and without a common trait.
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Figure 1.3: % times mentees choose A with and without advice.
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CHAPTER 2
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN TOP LEADERSHIP ROLES:
DOES WORKER BACKLASH MATTER?

2.1. Introduction
Numerous studies have shown that, holding performance constant, women are evaluated
more negatively than men. This is true in politics (Beaman Et Al., 2009; Branton Et
Al., 2018; Rheault Et Al., 2019), business (Boring, 2017; Mengel Et Al., 2017; Hengel,
2017; Sarsons, 2017) and laboratory settings (Ayalew Et Al., 2018; Grossman Et Al., 2016;
Shurchkov van Geen, 2017).
In this paper, we examine whether the anticipation of (harsher) negative judgment from
subordinates may induce women to select out of top leadership positions, and to perform
differently when in a leadership role.
The problem of missing top female leaders exists in all spheres of life. Only 19% of
firms worldwide have female top managers and only 6% of CEOs at S&P 500 companies are
women. In politics, women hold only 23% of seats in national parliaments worldwide.1 In
the US, only 10% of governors and 20% of the mayors of the 100 largest American cities
are women. In academia, averaging across all fields, less than one third of full professors
are women.2 This percentage falls to 13.9% in economics3 and 10.5% in engineering (Yoder,
2018).4
1

World Bank DataBank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS

2

For recent statistics on the gender leadership gap in the US, see Warner and Corley,
2017: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/05/21145352/WomenLeadershipGap2017factsheet1.pdf
3

See the 2017 report from the American Economic Association’s Committee of the Status of Women in
the Economics Profession (CSWEP): https://www.aeaweb.org/content/file?id=6388
4

A recent study by Nittrouer Et Al., 2018 shows that male academics in 6 disciplines are significantly
more likely to be invited to be colloquium speakers at prestigious US universities. The observed gender
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A number of studies have identified behavioral or preference-based constraints to women’s
self-selection into top leadership roles.5 There is evidence that risk aversion (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), reticence to initiate negotiations (Bowles Et Al., 2007; Babcock and Laschever,
2009), aversion to competitive environments (Gneezy Et Al., 2003; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Flory Et Al., 2014; Preece and Stoddard, 2015),6 preferences over job attributes
(Wiswall and Zafar, 2017), willingness to volunteer for or accept low promotability tasks
(Babcock Et Al., 2017) and self-stereotyping (Coffman, 2014) may hold women back. A
recent study by (Born Et Al., 2018) also shows that women are less likely to self-select into
a leadership role in male dominated environments.
Here, we ask whether women may be less likely than men to pursue top leadership roles
to avoid the social disapproval that they expect to receive from unhappy employees while
on the job. This might be because they anticipate receiving more disapproval than men,
in line with the literature, or because they are more averse to social judgment. The latter
would be the case if women had stronger social image motivations. Such motivations, as
modeled in Benabou and Tirole (2006), capture the role of others’ opinions in one’s utility,
i.e., the desire to be liked and respected by others.7 A few experimental studies suggest that
men and women differ in their image motivations. Jones and Linardi (2014), in the context
of a laboratory donation experiment, find that women are more likely to be “wallflowers”,
i.e., to be averse to any unwanted attention. Alan Et Al. (2018) find evidence of gender
difference is neither due to differences in the gender and rank of the available speakers, nor to women
declining invitations more often than men.
5

External demand-side constraints, such as taste-based or statistical discrimination stemming from traditional gender stereotypes concerning men and women’s productivities, skills and family constraints, are of
course also important. The existing evidence suggests that women are likely to be discriminated against in
higher-status jobs, particularly in male-dominated fields. For a review of the literature, see (Riach and Rich,
2006), (Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014) and (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017).
6

Erkal Et Al., 2018 show that women are more likely to compete for leadership roles if there is a system
in place that, by default, enroll individuals in the competition, while allowing them to opt-out.
7

The literature on how social observability and judgment affect behavior is fast growing. See for instance:
(Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Ariely Et Al. 2009; Linardi and McConnell, 2011;
Salmon and Serra 2017; Xiao and Houser, 2011). See also the recent overview provided by Bursztyn and
Jensen, 2017.
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differences in adolescents’ – but not in children’s – willingness to make risky decisions on
behalf of a group, and attribute such gender gap to a significant decline in teenage girls’
“social confidence”, as measured by their willingness to perform a real effort task under
public scrutiny. Banerjee Et Al (2015) find that while women are less likely to volunteer to
act as third part punishers in public goods games, the gender difference disappears when the
role of punisher is made anonymous and is therefore shielded from public scrutiny.
We consider a business environment, although our setting could be easily applied or
extended to other domains. In a firm setting, top leadership involves decision-making that
necessarily makes some workers happy and others unhappy. Think of promotions, demotions
and dismissals. This implies that backlash from unhappy employees, in the form of, at
the minimum, negative judgment and disapproving messages, is warranted. We investigate
whether the possibility of worker backlash deters women more than men from self-selecting
into top leadership roles and whether it differentially affects the actions of male and female
managers, possibly leading to gender differences in performance and outcomes.
We employ a novel laboratory experiment that simulates managerial decision-making
involving rank allocations among employees. This is a departure from the existing experimental studies of leadership, which have typically employed sequential public goods games
or coordination games where leaders can induce followers to increase their contributions
through leading by example (Guth Et Al., 2007; Grossman Et. Al, 2015; Jack and Recalde,
2015) or through the use of messages suggesting contributions (Brandts and Cooper, 2007;
Reuben and Timko, 2017).8 In our leadership experiment, the main task of a leader, which
we refer to as manager, is to promote or demote employees. Managers, who, by design,
are the highest earners in their group, have an informational advantage over the productivities of two employees in multiple rounds of a real effort task, and, at the beginning of
8

Other important studies of leadership have employed minimum-effort games or real effort tasks where
leaders incentivize (Shurchkov van Geen, 2017) or suggest the effort to be put in by followers (Chaudhuri Et
Al., 2018; Erkal Et Al., 2018), or tasks that require leaders to make decisions on behalf of their group (Alan
Et Al., 2018, Reuben Et Al., 2012, Born Et Al., 2018)
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each round, they have the responsibility of allocating ranks that determine the employees’
earnings. In each round, there can only be a high-rank and a low-rank employee; therefore,
rank allocation necessarily creates income inequality among workers.
In our baseline treatment, we assign the managerial role based on performance in a
preceding real effort task. In our two treatments of interest (Choice and Choice & Messages),
we allow subjects to volunteer for the leadership role.9 Crucially, in one of these treatments
(Choice & Messages), we allow managers to send free-form messages to workers following
each rank allocation stage, and we allow workers to send messages back; moreover, we allow
low-rank workers to send angry emoticons to signal their disapproval of the rank allocation
outcome. By comparing our two Choice treatments, we are able to clearly examine whether
the possibility of worker backlash plays a role in the observed gender leadership gap as
opposed to (or in addition to) a mere aversion to creating inequality among employees.10
Our design also allows us to test for gender differences in managerial performance, where
performance is measured as the propensity to assign the high rank to the best performing
worker. By varying our treatment conditions, we are able to assess whether the possibility of
worker backlash leads to gender differences in the criteria used when making decisions regarding employees’ promotions and demotions. The existing literature assessing the outcomes of
female versus male leadership tends to examine the effects of increased gender diversity on
corporate boards, typically due to the introduction of gender quotas, with mixed findings.
While female leadership seems to reduce firms’ short-term profits, due to fewer workforce
9

The manager is selected among the volunteers based on performance in the preceeding real effort task.

10
Numerous experimental studies have shown that women have different distributional preferences than
men, i.e., they are more egalitarian (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Dufwenberg
and Muren, 2006). This may induce (some) women to avoid jobs that would make them responsible for
creating inequalities among employees. If this is the case, we should observe a gender difference in selfselection into leadership already in our Choice treatment. Moreover, if aversion to creating inequality is the
only driver of gender differences in leadership and worker backlash plays no role, we should see no differences
between our Choice and Choice & Messages treatments.

48

layoffs (Matsa and Miller, 2013; Matsa and Miller, 2014),11 there is evidence that it improves
employees’ working conditions (Devicienti Et Al., 2016), and it reduces both the gender pay
gap among top executives (Matsa and Miller, 2011) and the gender gap in promotions (Kunze
and Miller, 2017).12 The main advantage of our experimental setting is that it allows comparing men’s and women’s managerial behavior and performance in a controlled environment
where male and female leaders are subject to the exact same environment, decision set and
incentive systems.
Through the analysis of the messages that managers send to their employees in the
Choice & Messages treatment we are also able to examine whether men and women have
different leadership styles, i.e., whether they communicate with and motivate employees
differently. This is an underdeveloped area of research in economics.13 While there are
numerous experimental studies where leaders can communicate with followers, we know of
only one study, Timko (2017), which examines gender differences in the language used by
leaders. In the context of a minimum effort game14 where leaders can send free-form messages
to group members to induce them to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium, Timko
(2017) finds that while men and women leaders are equally effective in inducing high effort,
men leaders send more assertive messages while women leaders, in treatments where followers
can send messages back, express significantly more often that they are part of the group.
11

On the other hand, Wolfers (2006) finds no significant differences to stock returns to firms under female
leadership, and both Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Schwartzziv (2017) provide evidence that gender diverse
boards are more active in monitoring executives.
12
Moreover, Flabbi Et Al. (2016) find evidence that female CEOs are better at evaluating the productivity
of female workers, leading to better allocations of female workers across tasks and to wage distributions that
more clearly reflect individual productivities. For a recent review of the literature, see Miller (2017)
13

The operations management literature distinguishes between transformational leaders who “transform
or change the basic values, beliefs, and attitudes of followers so that they are willing to perform beyond
the minimum levels specified by the organization” and transactional leaders, who “are founded on an exchange process in which the leader provides rewards in return for the subordinate’s effort” Podsakoff (1990).
Based on a meta-analysis of 45 studies, Eagly Et Al. (2003) conclude that female leaders tend to be more
transformational than male leaders, although the difference is small in magnitude.
14

In a minimum-effort game, members of a group simultaneously choose an effort level, with higher effort
being associated with higher individual costs. Payoffs depends positively on the lowest effort level chosen
within a group and negatively on the effort chosen by the decision-maker. In the game employed by Timko
(2017), payoffs for individual i are equal to: 200 − 5ef f orti + 6ef f ortmin .
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Studies in psychology also find gender differences in the general use of language, with men
using more assertive language - e.g., through imperative statements - and women using more
affiliative language - e.g., statements of support, agreement, and acknowledgment.15
Finally, by comparing the frequency and number of angry emoticons sent to male and
female managers by low-rank employees, we can provide a clean assessment of differences in
the attitudes of low-rank employees toward male and female managers. Since the conditions
under which low-rank workers can send angry messages to male or female leaders are identical
in the experimental setting, we are able to identify differences in workers’ attitudes driven
purely by the gender of their manager.16
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, women are less likely to self-select into a
leadership position in a setting where leaders have to make decisions that affect some workers
positively and others negatively. This is not due to gender-specific distributional preferences.
Rather, women’s reluctance to lead is caused by the possibility of worker backlash, i.e., the
possibility of receiving angry messages from employees. Second, while women are less likely to
volunteer to be managers, once in a leadership position, they do not perform differently than
men; in fact, both genders assign ranks based on worker productivity. This holds both in the
absence and in the presence of worker backlash. Gender differences in managerial decisionmaking emerge only when male and female leaders face two workers of equal productivity.
In this case, male managers tend to keep the ranking status quo (i.e., the worker that
was high-rank in the previous round stays high-rank), whereas female leaders are more
inclined to switch ranks, therefore promoting the worker previously assigned the low rank.
Third, the analysis of the messages sent by managers to workers suggests, in line with the
existing literature, that men and women have different leadership styles. While male and
female leaders are equally encouraging, men’s messages are more likely to induce competition
15

See, for instance, Leaper and Smith (2004) and Park Et Al. (2016).

16

There is also a large literature on attitudes toward male and female leaders in psychology, sociology and
management. These studies typically either provide written description of leadership situations, varying the
sex of the leader, or use trained actors to lead, allowing the experimenters to control the degree of success
the leader achieves (see, e.g. Swim Et Al, 1989).
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between workers, whereas women’s messages tend to emphasize team building, give practical
suggestions on how to better solve the real effort task, and are more likely to contain greetings
and apologies. Finally, male and female leaders are equally likely to receive worker backlash
(the extensive margin), yet female managers receive significantly more angry messages from
low-rank employees (the intensive margin). This last finding confirms that the observed
gender gap in willingness to assume leadership roles in our setting may be due to women’s
correct anticipation of more severe backlash from unhappy employees rather than by a greater
absolute aversion to negative judgment.
2.2 The Leadership Experiment: Experiment Design
The experiment consists of 6 active stages (Stages 1 to 6), followed by a survey, as
shown in Figure 1. An important feature of our design is the method we used to reveal
subjects’ genders to other participants without making gender artificially salient in the game.
We achieved this by asking subject to fill in a brief survey at the very beginning of the
session, before Stage 1. The survey asked for their age, gender, field of study, and previous
participation in an experiment. The answer to the gender question led to a pre-determined
list of either male or female names, which we took from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)’s
correspondence study of race-based discrimination.17 The male subjects saw a list of male
names and the female subjects saw a list of female names. We informed subjects that for the
duration of the experiment they would be identified with a fictitious name, and we invited
them to pick a name from the gender-specific list they saw on their screen.18 We did not
allow two or more subjects to choose the same name, so each name disappeared from the
list in real time when picked by another participant.
17

As our focus is on gender differences, we used Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004)’s list of distinctively
white sounding names only. Distinctive names are those that have the highest ratio of frequency in the
corresponding racial group.
18

We did not ask subjects to use their real names as we did not want to lift anonymity nor did we want
the potential confounding bias of race, nationality or ethnicity associated with the actual name of the subject
to play a role in the experiment.
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Stage 1 followed. In this stage, and in the following five stages, subjects engaged in a
real effort task. Previous studies of leadership have typically used public goods games or
coordination games. In order to resemble firm environments where managers are chosen
based on qualifications, in our study we wanted a game/task that would allow us to clearly
assess participants’ relative performance and select the best performing subject in a group
as the leader. Specifically, we wanted a gender-neutral task requiring cognitive thinking and
focus, where men and women would be equally confident and would perform equally well.
We therefore chose a language task, as it has been shown (Dreber Et Al. 2014; Niederle,
2016) that language-based tasks are less likely than math-based tasks to generate gender
differences in both self-confidence and performance in competitive environments.
In Stage 1, our real-effort task consisted in finding a 4-letter word in a 6x6 letter matrix in
5 minutes, for a maximum of 20 matrices.19 Subjects played individually. They received an
endowment of 40 ECU and earned 2 ECU for each puzzle they solved correctly in 5 minutes.
At the end of Stage 1, subjects received feedback on their performance and were provided
instructions on the following 5 stages (Stages 2 to 6) of the experiment. Crucially, they
were randomized into groups of 3 and they were shown the fictitious names of their group
members. In order to simulate male-dominated environments, the randomization algorithm
created groups of 2 men and 1 woman, whenever possible.20 Subjects remained in the same
group for the duration of the experiment.
In Stages 2 to 6, two group members played in the role of workers and one in the role of
manager. The roles of manager and worker were assigned at the end of Stage 1 according to
19

The decision screen was divided in two halves, as shown in Appendix. On the left, subjects saw the
matrix and on the right, they saw a list of 40 words. Each puzzle contained two words that appeared
on the list. In order to earn money, subjects had to identify one word per puzzle. We used the website
http://tools.atozteacherstuff.com/word-search-maker/wordsearch.php to create the puzzles and the website
http://www.thefreedictionary.com to find words of varying lengths. We ran some pilots of the puzzle task
with varying levels of difficulty with different sizes of the matrix, different word lengths, and different ways
in which words could be identified in the puzzle (forward, backward, up, down, diagonal etc). We found the
configurarion of finding 4-letter words that appear horizontally or vertically in a 6X6 matrix with a time of
5 minutes in Stage One to be optimal in creating enough heterogeneity in performance among subjects.
20

We ended up having 67% of the groups made of one woman and two men, 27% made of two women
and one man, and 6% made of men only.
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treatment-specific rules, and retained through Stage 6. The manager got a fixed wage of 100
ECU and his/her main task was to decide, at the beginning of each stage of the experiment,
which worker would be Rank A and which worker would be Rank B in the following stage.
The Rank A worker got a wage of 80 ECU, while the Rank B worker got a wage of 20 ECU.
After the rank allocation, all members of the group engaged in a similar puzzle task as in
Stage 1 of the experiment.21 Each correctly solved puzzle generated 2 ECU in addition to
the initial wage. Moreover, each puzzle solved correctly by the Rank A worker generated 2
ECU also to the Manager. Therefore the earnings from each of the 5 active stages (Stages 2
to 6) of the experiment were determined as follows:
• The Manager got 100 ECU + 2 ECU per puzzle + 2 ECU per puzzle solved by Rank
A worker;
• Rank A worker got 80 ECU plus 2 ECU per puzzle;
• Rank B worker got 20 ECU plus 2 ECU per puzzle.
Stages 3 to 6 are identical to Stage 2. However, at the end of each stage of the experiment,
the manager was informed about the performances of the current Rank A and Rank B workers
and had to decide whether to keep or reassign ranks before the next stage began.
Following Stage 6, subjects filled in a post-experiment questionnaire, where we elicited
demographics, previous leadership experiences, and answers to personality questions that
allow us to generate the Big 5 Agreeableness Personality Index, which has been shown to
be significantly higher in women than men (Schmitt et al., 2008) and to correlate negatively
with leadership ambition (Ertac and Gurdal, 2012).22
21

In order to account for learning effects, while in Stage 2 we kept the time limit to solve the 20 matrices
equal to 5 minutes, we reduced the time to 4 minutes in Stages 3 and 4, and to 3.5 minutes in Stages 5 and
6.
22

The Agreeableness Index measures the tendency to be kind, altruistic, trusting and trustworthy, and
cooperative. There is evidence from psychology studies (Judge and Bono, 2000) that agreebleness predicts
transformational leadership, i.e. leadership that operates through inspiration, intellectual stimulation and
individual consideration.
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One feature of our design requires further discussion. In our setting, the nature of the
task is such that the manager is always able to accurately assess the relative performances of
the two employees. This allows us to define and clearly measure managerial efficiency as the
likelihood that the manager will assign ranks based purely on workers’ relative performances.
Moreover, we designed the task so that it would lead as much as possible to constant relative
performances within a group across the 5 stages (Stages 2 to 6) of the experiment. This
is to limit the occurrence of rank-switching behavior driven purely by changes in relative
performances, as our aim is to examine rank-switching that is instead due to distributional
concerns and/or anticipation of worker backlash. Of course, in many settings workers’ performances cannot be objectively or precisely measured, and manager’s rank allocation decisions
are at least partly discretionary; it is the lack of transparency and the subjectivity of the
decision process that may be especially conducive to worker backlash. Note that even though
our task generates objective workers’ rankings, we still allow for lack of transparency and
perceived subjectivity of the manager’s decisions by not disclosing relative performances to
the workers. In other words, the workers do not know how they compare to each other, and
do not know what criteria the manager followed to allocate ranks. Finally, in our setting, we
can also investigate rank allocation decisions when the two workers performed equally well
in the task.23 This way, we are able to assess whether there are differences in the subjective
criteria used by male and female managers to allocate ranks when no objective distinction
could be made between the two workers.
2.3 Treatments
In our Baseline (T1) treatment, at the end of Stage 1, in each group of 3 participants
the manager is chosen based on performance in Stage 1.24 Recall that subjects participate in
the Stage 1 real effort task individually without knowing anything about Stages 2 to 6, and
23

This happened about 16% of the time, averaging across all treatments.

24

Since, by design, we have more men than women participating in each session of the experiment – due
to the objective of having male-dominated groups – we break ties in favor of women. Subjects are unaware
of this.
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therefore ignoring the fact that their performance will determine their role in the subsequent
stages of the experiment. This prevents competition-driven anxiety from playing a role in
determining subjects’ performance and subsequent chances of becoming the manager of the
group.25 At the beginning of Stage 2, subjects are informed that the manager was chosen
based on performance rather than randomly. This is important, as we aimed to simulate
an environment where employees could not doubt the qualifications of their manager. This
way, any differences in workers’ attitudes toward male versus female managers could not be
attributed to differential subjective beliefs about the right of the manager to hold his or her
role in the group.
In our Choice (T2) treatment, we allow subjects to self-select into the leadership position.
At the end of Stage 1, after receiving information about the next five stages of the experiment
and the fictitious names of their group members, we ask subjects to state whether they would
like to be the manager of their group. From the subset of those who volunteer for the manager
role, we choose the manager based on performance in Stage 1, as in Baseline.
Finally, in our Choice & Messages (T3) treatment, we still allow for self-selection into
the leadership role, yet we also allow for two-way free-form communication between the
manager and each of the two workers at each rank allocation stage. Specifically, at the
beginning of each stage (Stages 2 to 6), after assigning ranks A and B to the workers and
before the real-effort task begins, the manager needs to send a free-form message to the Rank
A worker and a free-form message to the Rank B worker. The manager can write anything
he or she wishes to communicate to each worker. After the manager submits the individual
messages, each worker sees the message sent to him or her and has to send a message back
to the manager. Importantly, the Rank B worker can also send up to 5 angry emoticons
to the manager to express disapproval of the ranking decision. The messages sent by the
25

While there is a large literature documenting gender differences in competitiveness and self-confidence
(especially in math-based tasks) we wanted to abstract from both factors in our experiment, in order to be
able to isolate the role played by the possibility of worker backlash in the origination of gender differences
in leadership.
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two workers, including the angry emoticons, are displayed to the manager before the next
real-effort task begins. The process is repeated at each rank-allocation stage. As before,
participants receive information about the rules governing Stages 2 to 6 of the experiment,
including the presence of two-way communication and the possibility of receiving angry
emoticons from Rank B workers, before they are asked whether they would like to be the
manager of their group.
Overall, our design allows us to clearly investigate: 1) gender differences in self-selection
into leadership roles in settings where leadership involves decision-making that makes some
people happy and others unhappy: 2) gender differences in managerial performance, as
measured by efficiency in the rank allocation decisions; 3) gender differences in leadership
styles (in the Choice & Messages treatment); and 4) differences in workers’ attitudes towards
male and female leaders, as measured by the frequency and number of angry emoticons sent
by rank B workers (in the Choice & Messages treatment).
Our payoff structure makes it optimal for each subject to volunteer for the manager role
and for each manager to always assign ranks based on past performance (since the nature
of the real effort task remains constant across stages and it is only the performance of the
Rank A worker that generates additional earnings to the manager). Therefore, if individuals
are purely money-maximizers we should see no gender differences in volunteering and rankallocations, with all subjects volunteering in T2 and T3, and all leaders assigning Rank A
to the best performing worker in each stage of the experiment in all treatments. However,
if managers also care about their workers’ payoffs and have distributional concerns – as
shown by a large experimental literature – they may not allocate ranks based purely on
task performance. Instead, they may alternate ranks between the two workers in order to
equalize their earnings. If women are more inequality averse than men, we may see more
arbitrary rank switches, and hence lower efficiency in rank allocation, from female managers
in all treatments. Gender differences in distributional preferences may also cause women to
be less willing than men to manage their team in both T2 and T3.
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The comparison between the Choice & Messages and the Choice treatments allows us to
test whether the possibility of worker backlash plays a role in the decision of men and women
to assume a leadership role. In particular, an aversion to the possibility of receiving angry
messages from rank B employees should lead to a decline in volunteering for the managerial
role in T3 as compared to T2. Moreover, if women are more averse to worker backlash or
expect more severe backlash than men, we should see a larger gender gap in volunteering
in T3 than in T2. Finally, aversion to workers’ backlash may also reduce efficiency in rank
allocation in T3 as compared to T2 and T1.
2.4 Implementation
We conducted 20 experimental sessions at the Laboratory for Research In Experimental
Economics (LREE) at Southern Methodist University. We involved a total of 306 participants, of which 41% are women, as shown in Table 1. Each subject participated in only one
session and one treatment. In each session, we had between 3 and 7 groups of three subjects
(one manager and two workers). Groups were fixed for the duration of the experiment, and
members of each group made decisions independently from all the other groups participating in a session. The experiment consisted of an initial brief survey and name-assignment
stage, followed by six active stages plus a post-experiment survey. Subjects were presented
with the instructions for each stage on their computer screen immediately before that stage
began. Additionally, at the beginning of Stage 1, they received hand-outs and verbal instructions about the puzzle-solving task, and at the end of Stage 1 they received further
verbal and written instructions (hand-outs) about the rules applying to Stages 2 to 6 of the
experiment.26
Only one randomly selected active stage of the experiment was used for actual payments.
Experimental earnings were converted from ECUs to dollars at the exchange rate of $1 for
6 ECU. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were
recruited among pre-registered LREE students.
26

The instructions employed in the Choice & Messages treatment are provided in Appendix.
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In order to guarantee anonymity, at the beginning of each session subjects were randomly
assigned an identification number, which they kept for the duration of the experiment. At
no point during the experiment did we ask subjects to reveal their names and, although
actual names were used during the payment process for accounting purposes, we informed
subjects that we would not register their names and therefore would not be able to link them
to the choices made in the experiment. Each session lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, with
average earnings of $28 per subject, including a $10 show-up fee.
2.5 Experimental Results
We start by describing our subject pool and conducting balance tests across treatments.
A total of 182 men and 124 women participated in the experiment. In Table 2.10, in the
Appendix, we report descriptive statistics for our male and female sample pools, i.e. their
average age, whether they were majoring in STEM, Business or Economics or in a different
field, whether they were native speakers, whether they reported having held a leadership
position, and their average Big 5 Agreeableness Index. The average age is 22.7, with no
significant differences across treatments and between men and women. Most of our participants are STEM, Business or Economics majors, although the percentage of men majoring
in these fields (85%) is significantly higher than the percentage of women (68%, p = 0.000).
Most subjects reported having held a leadership role in the past, and most of them are not
native speakers (36% of men and 47% of women are native speakers, p = 0.066). In line
with the existing literature, our female participants score significantly higher than men in
the Big 5 Agreeableness Index (p = 0.007). Balance tests reveal no statistically significant
differences in individual characteristics across treatments in the female sample, whereas in
the male sample the only significant difference is in the percentage of native speakers, which
is significantly higher (p = 0.020) in T3 than in T2.
Before presenting and discussing our main findings, we assess possible gender differences
in the performance in the real effort task employed in the study. Recall that we aimed
to design a real effort task that would be as much as possible gender-neutral. Table 2.2
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reports the average number of puzzles correctly solved by men and women in Stage 1 of
the experiment (which determined participants’ chances of becoming managers later on).
The lack of statistically significant differences in the performances of men and women in all
treatments suggests that we succeeded in employing a gender-neutral task. Table 2.2 also
shows that there are no statistically significant differences in performances across treatments
for both the male and female samples. This is confirmed by regression analysis for both Stage
1 and all the active stages of the experiment. The corresponding estimates are reported in
Table 2.11 in the Appendix.
We also wanted our real effort task to lead to stable performance rankings within a group.
In other words, we wanted to employ a task whereby being the best(worst) performer in the
task in Stage 1 would be a good predictor of the likelihood of being at the top(bottom) of
the group in the subsequent stages. This is what we see in the data. Descriptive statistics27
show that if a subject is the top(bottom) performer in Stage 1, he or she is the top(bottom)
performer in about 80% of the following stages.
In what follows, we present and discuss the core results of the paper, i.e., the effects of our
treatments on men’s and women’s willingness to volunteer for the manager position (Section
2.5.1), and on their performance once in the leadership role (Section 2.5.2). We then present
our findings on male and female managers’ leadership styles (Section 2.5.3). We conclude by
reporting on the attitudes of Rank B workers toward male and female leaders, as measured
by the number of angry messages sent in our Choice & Messages treatment (Section 2.5.4).
2.5.1 Gender differences in the decision to be manager
Almost all subjects volunteered to be a manager in our Choice treatment, with no significant differences between men and women, as shown in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2. However, a
large and statistically significant gender gap emerges in our Choice & Messages treatment,
where we see 78% of women volunteer to be a manager as opposed to 95% of men (p = 0.007).
This suggests that women are no less willing to assume the leadership role in our setting
27

Not presented here but available upon request.
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absent the possibility of worker backlash. In other words, the gender leadership gap that
we observe is due purely to gender differences in the reaction to the possibility of receiving
angry messages from Rank B workers.
This is confirmed by regression analysis, as shown in Table 2.4. We report estimates
generated by linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1
if the subject stated the he or she would like to be the manager of his/her group.28 We first
examine the male and female samples separately (columns 1 to 6). We start by testing for
treatment effects by including our treatment variables only. We then gradually add demographics and other individual characteristics. We also control for individuals’ performance
in the real effort task in Stage 1, as this may affect subjects’ perceived probability of being
chosen as the manager if they volunteered. Finally, following Born et al. (2018), which show
that the gender composition of a group may affect women’s self-selection into leadership, we
include a dummy equal to 1 if there were two women in the group. Recall that by design we
aimed to have only groups with 1 woman and 2 men. However, we ended up having 2 women
and 1 man in 26% of our groups. Note that we lose a few observations when controlling for
past leadership positions and the Big 5 Agreeableness index. This is due to a software glitch
that prevented us from conducting the post-experiment survey in one of our sessions.
The estimates in columns 1 to 6 confirm that women, but not men, are less likely to
volunteer as managers when facing the possibility of worker backlash. We also see that
performance in the task is a strong predictor of volunteering for women. As for the individual
characteristics affecting self-selection into the manager role, they seem to differ by gender.
In the male sample, the only significant variable is the Big 5 Agreeableness score, which, in
line with the existing studies, appears with a negative sign, suggesting that less agreeable,
hence more competitive and aggressive men, are more likely to volunteer for the manager
28

We employ linear probability models because it has been shown (Norton Et Al., 2004) that interpreting
interaction terms in non-linear models is not straightforward. Importantly, Norton Et Al., (2004) show that
the marginal effect of an interaction term may not be the same as the estimated coefficient, and further that
the standard t-test is inaccurate. Nevertheless, we report estimates from probit regressions in Table 2.12 in
Appendix for comparison. The results are qualitatively the same.
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role. This does not apply to the female sample. Among women, the only robust determinant
of volunteering decision is the field of study, with women majoring in STEM, Business and
Economics being more likely to want to be managers. This is essentially indicating that
women who have already self-selected into fields that are typically male-dominated and
conducive to competitive high-paying jobs, are also more likely to self-select into leadership
roles in the experiment. The gender composition of the group does not seem to affect
individuals’ decision to self-select into the leadership role in our setting, regardless of their
gender.29
Our main finding is confirmed when pooling the male and female samples and introducing both a female dummy and its interaction with our Choice&Messages treatment. The
estimates in column 9, in particular, confirm that while men are not less likely to volunteer
to be managers in T3 than in T2, women are both less likely to volunteer in T3 than men (see
the estimated coefficient and p-value obtained for FemalexT3 ) and less likely to volunteer
in T3 than T2 (p − value = 0.039, Wald test for the sum of coefficients of Female and its
interaction with T3). We summarize our first result as follows:
Result 1 Women are less likely to volunteer for the leadership position when facing the
possibility of receiving angry messages from employees.
Given the observed positive correlation between performance in the task in Stage 1 and
women’s decision to volunteer to be manager, we examine whether gender differences in
the decision to volunteer are more extreme for bottom performers than for the middle and
top performers. Figure 2.3 reports the percentages of volunteers among men and women in
T2 and T3 by performance terciles.30 In the Choice treatment, we do not see evidence of
29

However, we should note that we did not randomize the number of women across treatments (as we
aimed to have groups of 2 men and one woman only). Any difference in the number of women per group is
purely due to the gender composition of the subjects that showed up for the experiment on a given day. As a
result, we have significantly fewer groups with two women and one man in the Choice&Messages treatment
(17%) than in the other two treatments (36% in Baseline and 35% in Choice).
30

The bottom tercile is made of subjects who completed 12 or less puzzles correctly in Stage 1 of the
experiment. The middle tercile consistes of students who completed more than 12 puzzles but less than 20
puzzled in Stage 1. The top tercile is made of students who completed 20 out of 20 puzzles in Stage 1.
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significant gender differences in self-selection into the manager role for any tercile (p = 0.311
for the bottom tercile, p = 0.674 for the middle tercile, p = 0.277 for the top tercile). In
contrast, under Choice&Messages, significant gender differences in volunteering exist among
both bottom (p = 0.065) and middle performers (p = 0.009). Indeed, in both groups, we
observe a 30 percentage point gender leadership gap. Importantly, the gender gap closes
among the very top performers (p = 0.883), i.e. the men and women who solved 20 out of
20 puzzles in Stage 1. The figure also shows that while there are no significant differences
in volunteering among performance terciles in the male sample for either treatment, female
top performers are significantly more likely to volunteer than female bottom performers,
especially in the Choice & Messages treatment (p = 0.058 in Choice&Messages, p = 0.104
in Choice).31 This indicates that, although in our setting the performance of the manager
is never disclosed to the employees and the manager is never in competition with his or her
workers, women feel that, in order to be managers of their group, they need to be extremely
good at the task. Men do not seem to have the same concerns.
2.5.2 Gender differences in managers’ decision-making
Before testing for gender differences in rank-allocation decisions, we examine whether men
and women who become managers through self-selection (in Choice and Choice&Messages)
differ in some salient individual characteristics. We find that the only significant difference
between male and female managers is their score in the Big 5 Agreeableness index, with
women being more “agreeable” than men, as shown in Table 2.13 in Appendix. Note that
we do not see any significant difference in the percentages of men and women majoring in
STEM, business or economics, which indicates that, as expected, our female manager sample
is more likely to be majoring in male-dominated fields as compared to the general female
population.
Next, we look at the behavior of male and female managers in Stages 2 to 6 of the
31

Female top performers are also more likely to volunteer than female middle performers, albeit the
difference is not statistically signficant (p = 0.142 in Choice&Messages, p = 0.259 in Choice).
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experiment. Our primary outcome variable is the likelihood that the manager assigns ranks
based on worker productivity, i.e., the number of correctly solved puzzles in the previous
stage. Specifically, in each stage, we define a rank-allocation by a manager as efficient if
the manager assigns Rank A to the worker that solved more puzzle in the previous stage.
Note that such definition only applies to cases where there is a clear difference between the
performances of the two workers. In what follows, we restrict the analysis to such cases,
while in Section 2.5.4 we examine rank allocations when the managers faced two equally
productive workers.
Efficiency in rank-allocations
Table 2.5 displays the percentage of efficient rank-allocations made by male and female
managers in our three treatments, i.e., the percentage of times that Rank A was assigned to
the worker who performed best in the previous stage (when the difference in the performances
of the two workers was non-zero). In all of our treatments, we find no evidence of gender
differences in the efficiency of rank allocations. It seems that, in the female sample, selfselected managers are more likely to allocate ranks based on performance as compared to
exogenously chosen managers (compare T2 and T3 to T1), while we see no such difference
in the male sample. Finally, the possibility of worker backlash does not seem to significantly
decrease the efficiency of the decision-making of both male and female managers.32
One important factor that may not be constant across treatments and managers’ gender
is the difference in the performances of the two workers. For instance, it is possible that in
the Choice&Messages treatment, managers were more likely to face similarly skilled workers,
which may have led to more frequent rank switches. In order to control for the difference
in workers’ performances and other individual characteristics, we estimate a set of linear
probability models, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the manager
assigned Rank A to the best performing worker and 0 otherwise. Our results are displayed
32

Figure 2.6 in Appendix breaks down the data by stage, i.e., it shows the percentage of efficient rank
allocations by male and female managers in each stage (when there was a clear best performer among the
employees).
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in Table 2.6.33 We first look at the male manager and female manager samples separately
(columns 1 to 6) and then pool the samples while introducing a female manager dummy and
its interaction with our treatment dummies (columns 7 to 9). In all specifications, we cluster
the standard errors at the group level. We always start by including only our treatment
dummies and a stage dummy. We then control for the difference between the previous stage’s
performances of the worker currently assigned rank A and the worker currently assigned
Rank B [(RA − RB )lag ]. We also control for the manager’s own performance in the previous
stage (Perf lag ). In the most comprehensive specification, we include demographics and other
individual characteristics (same as in Table 2.4).
The estimates show that there are no significant differences in the likelihood of making
efficient rank allocations across treatments. This is true for both male and female managers.
The difference between the performances of the two workers is an important predictor of the
likelihood of allocating rank A to the best performing worker. Indeed, the positive and highly
significant estimated coefficient of (RA −RB )lag indicates that a manager is significantly more
likely to allocate Rank A to a worker the greater the difference between such worker’s and the
other workers’ numbers of completed puzzles. Importantly, the estimates in columns 7 to 9
show no evidence of gender differences in the efficiency of rank allocations in all treatments.
Our second result follows:
Result 2 Female managers are as likely as male managers to allocate ranks efficiently, both
in the absence and in the presence of the possibility of worker backlash.

Rank allocation when workers perform equally
An important feature of our real effort task is that it allows for a clear and objective
assessment of workers’ performance, thus making it possible to examine managers’ decisionmaking, i.e. their likelihood of allocating ranks based on relative worker performances in
33

Probit regressions generate similar results, except that, when estimating probit regressions we are unable
to control for the difference in the performances of rank A and rank B workers, since any positive difference
predicts the dependent variable perfectly.
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the different treatments. In this section, we examine cases where managers face equally
performing workers and therefore, when allocating ranks, are forced to use criteria other
than objective assessments of workers’ productivities. This way, we can investigate whether
male and female managers use different subjective criteria in their rank allocation decisions.
Managers faced equally performing workers in 16% of the cases over the five stages of
the experiment, with no signficant differences across treatments.34 In Table 2.7, we estimate
linear probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a worker is assigned
Rank A in a given stage.35 Since the only information managers have about their workers is
their gender and the ranks they held in the previous stage (besides their productivities), we
include both variables in our empirical specification. We first include only the rank status of
the worker in the previous stage, i.e., whether he/she was Rank A, the gender of the worker,
the gender of the manager and our treatment dummies (column 1). We then include the
interaction between previous rank A status and the gender of the manager (column 2).
The estimates show that workers under male and female leadership are allocated ranks
differently. In particular, workers under a male manager are more likely to be allocated Rank
A if they were Rank A in the previous stage. In other words, male managers, when facing
equally performing workers, tend to keep the ranks assigned in the previous stage. Female
managers, on the other hand, are less likely to keep the status quo and more likely to switch
ranks (p − value = 0.020, Wald test for the sum of coefficients of Female Manager and its
interaction with the worker’s lagged Rank A status). Our next result follows.
Result 3 When facing equally productive workers, male managers are more likely to keep
the previous stage’s ranks whereas female managers are more likely to switch ranks.
In column 3, we also include interactions with our treatment dummies. This allows us
to test whether male and female managers allocate ranks differently to equally performing
34

The two workers in a group performed equally 14% of the times in Baseline, 13% of the times in Choice
and 20% of the time in Choice&Messages, with no significant differences across treatments.
35

Probit regressions generate the same results and are available from the authors upon request.
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workers depending on the treatment. What emerges is that while male managers are more
likely to keep current ranks (i.e., less likely to switch ranks) in the Baseline and the Choice
treatments, they behave similarly to female managers – i.e., they tend to switch ranks –
when facing the possibility of worker feedback in the Choice&Messages treatment.
Managers’ responsiveness to angry messages in T3
In our Choice & Messages (T3) treatment, Rank B workers can send up to 5 angry
emoticons to their manager after learning their rank, at the beginning of each stage (Stages
2 to 6). We analyze workers’ likelihood of sending angry emoticons, and the number of
emoticons sent, in Section 2.5.4. Here, we examine an important aspect of a managers’
behavior and performance, i.e., how they respond to worker backlash. In particular, are
managers more likely to assign Rank A to a less productive Rank B worker after the receipt
of angry messages? And does the receipt of angry messages affect male and female managers’
future rank-allocation decisions differently? The answer to both questions is no, according to
our data. If we replicate the analysis displayed in Table 6 while adding the number of angry
emoticons received by the Rank B worker in the previous stage, we find that worker backlash,
i.e. the number of angry emoticons received, has no significant impact on a manager’s
likelihood of allocating Rank A to the best performing worker. This is true for both male
and female managers.36 Furthermore, the analysis of the likelihood that a Rank B worker
is promoted to Rank A conditional on the angry emoticons sent in the previous stage – see
Table 14 in Appendix – shows that, no matter the gender of the manager, the likelihood of
being promoted is not affected by the number of angry emoticons sent. If anything, sending
angry emoticons to a manager may lower the likelihood of being promoted.
Result 4 Male and female managers’ ranking decisions are equally unaffected by the receipt
of angry messages from employees.

36

The corresponding regression table – not displayed here – is available from the authors upon request.
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2.5.3 Gender differences in leadership styles
Recall that in our Choice & Messages treatment, the manager had to send a free form
message to each worker following the rank allocation decision and before the real effort task
began. In this section we examine whether the messages sent by male and female managers
to Rank A and Rank B workers differ in content and tone. We enlisted two independent
coders, who classified the messages sent by managers over the 5 stages of the experiment
as: 1) encouraging; 2) inducing competition among workers; 3) mentioning the number of
puzzles solved by the worker; 4) mentioning fairness; 5) providing suggestions on how to
solve the task; and 6) using cordial words like “thank you” and “sorry.”37
Both male and female managers sent primarily encouraging messages to both Rank A and
Rank B workers, as shown in Figure 2.4. Among the other categories, we see most messages
being either meant to induce competition among workers or suggesting how to better do
the task or using cordial words. We sum up the messages in the latter two categories and
refer to them as “nice” messages. We focus only on these main three message categories encouraging, competitive and “nice” messages - in the analysis below.
We find that over the five stages of the experiment, male managers sent significantly
more messages inducing competition among workers. This is true both for the messages
sent to Rank A workers (p = 0.077 two-side ttest, p = 0.114 Wilcoxon rank-sum test) and
those sent to Rank B workers (p = 0.005 two-side ttest, and p = 0.002 Wilcoxon ranksum test). On the other hand, women sent more “nice” messages although the difference
is not statistically significant for the messages sent to the rank B workers, and borderline
significant at the conventional level for the messages sent to Rank A workers (p = 0.117
two-side ttest, p = 0.09 Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Our findings are in line with studies of
language in psychology (Park Et Al., 2016), showing that women are more likely to use
37

For each category, we computed the reliability coefficient of intercoder agreement (Cohen, 1960). Categories with κ > 0.3 are considered fair or better (Landis and Koch, 1977). The computed κ scores indicate
that all categories have been coded with at least a fair agreement between the two coders. We therefore
aggregate the responses of the two coders by taking their averages.
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affiliative language, i.e., statements of support and acknowledgment. We summarize our
findings as follows:
Result 5 Male and female managers communicate differently to employees, with men being
more likely to use language aimed at inducing competition among workers, and women being
more likely to use words signaling support and acknowledgment.

2.5.4 Gender differences in the extent of received worker backlash
In this section, we examine the angry emoticons that Rank B workers sent to male versus
female managers in our Choice&Messages treatment. This is what we call worker backlash.
A first look at the data shows that male and female managers are equally likely to receive at
least one angry emoticon from rank B workers, as shown in the first row of Table 2.8. Over
the 5 stages of the experiment, both male and female managers received at least one angry
emoticon about 45 percent of the times. Figure 2.7, in Appendix, shows the percentages of
male and female managers who received at least one angry emoticon in each stage of the
experiment. While female managers started off by being slightly more likely to receive at least
one angry message from their rank B worker, the difference is not statistically significant.
Figure 2.5 and the second row of Table 2.8, however, show that, conditional on receiving at
least one emoticon, female managers receive a higher number of angry emoticons on average.
Next, we conduct regression analysis on Rank B workers’ decisions to send one or more
angry emoticons to their manager over the 5 stages of the experiment. We first look at the
decision to send at least one angry emoticon (i.e., worker backlash at the extensive margin)38
and then turn to the number of emoticons sent, conditional on sending at least one (i.e.,
worker backlash at the intensive margin). By conducting regression analysis, we are able
to examine the impact of the gender of the manager, the gender of the worker and their
interaction. In columns 3 and 7 of Table 9 we add the worker’s performance and his/her
38

As before, for ease of interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we report findings from linear probability models. Probit regressions generate qualitatively the same results and are available from the authors
upon request.
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rank status in the previous stage, and in columns 4 and 8 we add workers’ demographics
and individual characteristics. In all regressions, we cluster the standard errors at the group
level.
The estimates in columns 1 to 4 confirm the lack of statistically significant differences in
worker backlash toward male versus female managers at the extensive margin. The estimates
in columns 5 to 8 show that female managers are subject to more severe worker backlash at
the intensive margin, and this is due primarily to the behavior of male Rank B workers. In
fact, while female managers do not seem to receive more angry emoticons when averaging
across the behaviors of male and female Rank B workers (column 5), gender differences
emerge when looking at the decisions of male and female Rank B workers separately. The
significant coefficient of the “To Female Manager” dummy in columns 6 to 8 indicate that
male workers send significantly more angry messages to female managers. Interestingly, the
positive and significant coefficient of the female dummy indicates that female Rank B workers
send more angry emoticons to male managers. Since, by design, we have more male workers
than female workers in our setting to simulate a male-dominated work environment, female
managers end up receiving more negative messages in total. Our findings suggest that a
more gender equal workforce would likely annul the gender difference in worker backlash.
We summarize our results below.
Result 6 a) Female and male managers are equally likely to receive worker backlash;
b) Female managers receive more severe backlash, due to male rank B workers’ tendency
to send more angry messages to female than male managers.
Recall that in our Choice&Messages treatment, workers also sent free-form messages to
their manager at the rank allocation stage. Two independent coders categorized the messages
sent by the Rank A workers and by Rank B workers as: 1) expressing commitment to hard
work; 2) containing jokes; 3) justifying past performance; 4) requesting the high rank; 5)
challenging the manager, either by asking information about the relative performances in
previous round, or by boasting about own performance, or by expressing anger about the
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ranking. We report the average numbers of messages of each kind received by male and
female managers in Tables 2.15 and 2.16 in Appendix. While it seems that female managers
are more likely to be challenged by Rank B workers and more likely to receive messages in
which workers (of both ranks) justify their performances in the task, the differences are not
statistically significant at the conventional level. Overall, we do not find any evidence of
differences in the language used by Rank A and Rank B workers when communicating with
their male or female managers.
2.6 Conclusion
The literature on gender differences in leadership is still in its nascent stage. We contribute to this literature by conducting an experimental study aimed at enhancing our understanding on whether and why men and women differ in their willingness to assume leadership
roles and in their behaviors as leaders. We ask whether women are less likely to self-select
into managerial positions that require decision-making generating inequalities among employees, possibly leading to worker backlash. We find strong evidence of gender difference in
willingness to assume a managerial role. This is not due to gender differences in aversion to
generating inequality among employees. Rather, it is due to men’s and women’s differential
responses to the possibility of worker backlash. The analysis of the angry messages sent
by employees to their managers shows that female managers receive more severe backlash,
suggesting that women’s reluctance to assume leadership positions may be due to the correct
anticipation of the harsher negative judgment they would receive from their subordinates,
rather than or in addition to a greater absolute aversion to social disapproval.
By employing a controlled experiment, we are also able to clearly assess the performances
of male and female managers under identical incentive systems and decision sets. In our setting, managers have the task to assign either a high rank or a low rank to two employees,
where ranks determine the employees’ earnings, and workers’ productivities are only visible
to the manager. We do not find any significant gender differences in managerial performance, with both genders assigning ranks based on workers’ relative performance, both in
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the absence and in the presence of the possibility of worker backlash. Moreover, the receipt
of angry messages does not seem to affect the subsequent rank-allocation decisions of either
(self-selected) male or female managers. The only gender difference we observe in managers’
behaviors concerns the allocation of ranks when the two workers are equally productive,
hence equally deserving of the high rank. In these cases, we see that male managers are
more likely to keep the status quo, i.e. they tend to keep ranks as they were in the past
(when possibly the two workers performed differently). In contrast, female managers are
more likely to switch ranks, therefore promoting the worker who was previously assigned the
low rank. This is the only instance where gender differences in distributional preferences
seem to lead to differential rank-allocation decisions.
Finally, we find evidence of gender differences in the language used by male and female
managers to communicate with and motivate their workers. In line with the existing literature, we find that men are more likely to use language aimed at inducing competition
among workers, whereas women are more likely to use words signaling support and acknowledgment. In contrast, we do not find any significant differences in the language used by
employees when communicating with male versus female managers.
Overall, our study offers important insights into an under-studied behavioral constraint
that may prevent women from self-selecting into top leadership roles that involve the management of lower rank employees, including the necessity to promote, demote or dismiss
members of the workforce. In evaluating the relevance and implications of our findings, it
is important to note that our analysis is based on a laboratory setting where decisions are
anonymous and worker backlash takes the form of angry emoticons sent by only one other
subject via a computer terminal, rather than via personal face to face interaction. We may
therefore be underestimating the role that the possibility of worker backlash plays in contributing to the gender leadership gap in field settings, where managers have to face more
direct and personal expressions of anger from multiple unhappy subordinates.
Our study could be extended in many interesting ways. First, future work could examine
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whether and how the gender (im)balance existing within the workforce may affect women’s
willingness to assume the managerial role. If, as suggested by our data, female managers
are more likely to receive worker backlash from male workers and this contributes to their
reluctance to self-select into the leadership role, having a more gender balanced workforce
may reduce the gender leadership gap. By design, in our experiment we aimed to have all
groups made of two men and one woman to simulate male dominated work environments.
We ended up having some (26%) of the groups composed of two women and one man. While
we did not see the gender composition of the groups affect subjects’ self-selection into the
leadership role, we are unable to draw definite conclusions as we did not purposely randomize
the gender composition of the groups across our treatments. Another interesting extension
of our study would be to examine the relationship between the possibility of worker backlash
and leadership decisions in a setting where managers can also receive approval messages
from happy employees. In particular, future work could assess how strong or numerous the
expected approval messages should be to compensate for the expected negative messages
and therefore induce more women to self-select into top leadership roles.
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Table 2.1: Sessions and treatments
Sessions

Groups

7
6
7
20

34
33
35
102

Baseline (T1)
Choice (T2)
Choice&Messages (T3)
Total

Participants
Men Women Total
61
41
102
57
42
99
64
41
105
182
124
306

Table 2.2: Number of correctly solved puzzles in Stage 1

Baseline (T1)
Choice (T2)
Choice&Messages (T3)
H0 : T1=T2 (p-value)
H0 : T1=T3 (p-value)
H0 : T2=T3 (p-value)

Men

Women

13.77
13.44
14.16
0.75
0.72
0.50

13.83
14.57
14.70
0.59
0.53
0.92

H0 : M=W
p-value
0.96
0.34
0.64

P-values are generated by double-sided tests of equality of means.

Table 2.3: Percentages of subjects who volunteered to be managers

Choice (T2)

Men
%
94.74

Women
%
92.86

Choice&Messages (T3)

95.31

78.05

H0 : T2=T3 (Chi-square test: p-value)
[Fisher: p-value]

0.884
[1.00]

0.055*
[0.067*]

H0 : M=W
p-value
0.698
[0.696]
0.007***
[0.010***]

P-values in column 3 are generated by Chi-square tests. P-values from Fisher exact
tests are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.4: Regression analysis of the decision to be manager
Men
(2)
0.018
(0.627)

(3)
0.043
(0.339)

Performance

0.007
(0.202)

Age

(4)
-0.148*
(0.057)

(7)
-0.057
(0.151)

All

(5)
-0.134*
(0.060)

(6)
-0.154*
(0.063)

0.008
(0.154)

0.025***
(0.003)

0.027***
(0.003)

0.016***
(0.002)

0.003
(0.250)

0.005
(0.193)

0.002
(0.800)

0.005
(0.552)

0.004
(0.332)

STEM-bus-eco

0.082
(0.333)

0.060
(0.609)

0.158*
(0.086)

0.210**
(0.033)

0.148**
(0.047)

Native

-0.034
(0.495)

-0.058
(0.338)

-0.117
(0.124)

-0.100
(0.296)

-0.074
(0.143)

Choice&Messages(T3)

(1)
0.006
(0.886)

Dep. Variable: Subject wants to be manager
Women

(8)
0.006
(0.886)

(9)
0.044
(0.347)

Leadership

0.077
(0.463)

0.087
(0.477)

0.075
(0.327)

big5-agree

-0.008**
(0.046)

0.004
(0.537)

-0.002
(0.669)

Two women in group

-0.029
(0.690)

-0.064
(0.442)

-0.035
(0.521)

Female

-0.097**
(0.028)

Female x T3

-0.019
(0.708)

-0.154*
(0.077)
Constant
0.947*** 0.726*** 0.814*** 0.929*** 0.468**
0.165
0.981*** 0.947***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.037)
(0.623)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Fem.+Fem.xT3=0
0.015**
Observations
121
121
110
83
83
76
204
204
Estimates generated by linear probability models. Robust pvalues in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.040
(0.529)
-0.182**
(0.044)
0.487***
(0.005)
0.039**
186

Table 2.5: Efficiency in rank allocations

Baseline (T1)
Choice (T2)
Choice&Messages (T3)
H0 : T1=T2 (p-value)
H0 : T1=T3 (p-value)
H0 : T2=T3 (p-value)

% of Efficient Rank Allocations
Male
Female
H0 : M=W
Manager Manager
p-value
81.33
76.06
0.436
83.82
90.67
0.218
84.29
87.14
0.629
0.695
0.017**
0.638
0.090*
0.941
0.499

We report the percentage of times the best performing worker was selected as
Rank A by a male or a female manager. p-values are generated by Chi-square tests.
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Table 2.6: The allocation of Rank A to the best performing worker
Dep. Var: Manager allocates Rank A to best performer
Male Managers
Female Managers
All
Choice (T2)
Choice&Mess.
(T3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.029
(0.727)

0.066
(0.273)

0.043
(0.347)

0.149*
(0.062)

0.066
(0.274)

0.064
(0.281)

0.028
(0.731)

0.067
(0.254)

0.058
(0.292)

0.028

0.035

0.024

0.113

0.061

0.060

0.028

0.036

0.035

(0.746)

(0.524)

(0.619)

(0.151)

(0.304)

(0.332)

(0.742)

(0.518)

(0.496)

0.042***
(0.000)

0.043***
(0.000)

0.041***
(0.000)

0.043***
(0.000)

0.041***
(0.000)

0.043***
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.992)

-0.003
(0.717)

0.012
(0.105)

0.021**
(0.023)

0.005
(0.321)

0.006
(0.327)

(RA − RB )lag
Perflag
Female

-0.053
(0.549)

-0.011
(0.836)

-0.012
(0.836)

Female x T2

0.122
(0.288)

-0.005
(0.953)

-0.008
(0.920)

Female x T3

0.085
(0.463)

0.025
(0.762)

0.019
(0.807)

-0.039**
(0.002)
0.970***
(0.000)
0.999

-0.021**
(0.014)
0.602***
(0.000)
0.119

-0.020**
(0.021)
0.677**
(0.011)
0.424

Fem+FemxT2=0

0.340

0.373

0.758

Fem+FemxT3=0

0.669

0.371

0.406

Stage
Constant
T2=T3

-0.046**
(0.024)
0.997***
(0.000)
0.993

-0.023*
(0.066)
0.706***
(0.000)
0.649

-0.022*
(0.083)
1.035***
(0.000)
0.732

-0.033**
(0.025)
0.891***
(0.000)
0.545

Observations
Controls
Clusters

-0.020*
(0.080)
0.455***
(0.005)
0.931

-0.020*
(0.087)
0.261
(0.510)
0.941

213
213
209
216
216
205
429
429
414
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
47
47
46
53
53
50
100
100
96
R2
0.032
0.523
0.601
0.047
0.413
0.447
0.039
0.468
0.486
Estimates generated by linear probability models. Standard errors clustered at the group level. (RA -RB )lag is the
difference in the performances of Rank A and Rank B workers in the previous stage. Perflag is the performance of
the manager in the previous stage. Robust pval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.7: Worker’s likelihood of being assigned Rank A under equal performance

Rank Alag
Choice (T2)
Choice & Messages (T3)
Female worker
Female Manager

Dep. Var: Worker is assigned Rank A in current stage
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.020
0.574**
0.881***
(0.907)

(0.025)

(0.000)

0.009

0.006

-0.058

(0.745)

(0.804)

(0.742)

0.013

0.009

0.237

(0.740)

(0.801)

(0.215)

0.047

0.033

0.054

(0.734)

(0.798)

(0.643)

0.013

0.417***

(0.742)

(0.008)

Female Manager x Rank Alag

-0.817**
(0.011)

Rank Alag x T2

0.418***
(0.005)

-1.022***
(0.000)

0.037
(0.848)

Rank Alag x T3

-0.765**
(0.030)

Female Manager x Rank Alag x T2

0.123
(0.626)

Female Manager x Rank Alag x T3

0.425
(0.228)

Stage
Constant

0.000

0.000

0.007

(0.820)

(0.839)

(0.381)

0.480***

0.192

0.081

(0.000)

(0.101)

(0.564)

Fem.Manager + Fem.Manager x RankAlag =0
0.020**
Fem.Manager + Fem.Manager x RankAlag +Fem.Manager x RankAlag x T2=0
Fem.Manager + Fem.Manager x RankAlag +Fem.Manager x RankAlag x T3=0
Observations
138
138
Clusters
41
41
R2
0.002
0.135

0.001***
0.011**
0.538
138
41
0.214

Estimates generated by linear probability models. Sample restricted to cases where the two workers performed equally.
Standard errors clustered at the group level. Robust pval in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.8: The receipt of angry emoticons
Male
Manager
Received at least 1 angry emoticon (% of times)
43.75
Number of angry emoticons received
2.86
(conditional on receiving at least 1)

Female
Manager
46.32
3.41

H0 : M=W
p-value
0.734
0.156
(one-sided: 0.078)

P-values are generated by Chi-square test (row 1) or a double-sided test of equality of means (row 2).

Table 2.9: Regression analysis of worker backlash

To Female Manager
Female

Worker Sent at least 1 angry emoticon
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.077
0.011
0.025
0.007
(0.472)

(0.929)

(0.862)

(0.961)

(0.151)

(0.066)

(0.037)

(0.074)

0.281*

0.149

0.162

0.112

0.753

1.421*

1.675**

1.802***

(0.063)

(0.461)

(0.473)

(0.638)

(0.163)

(0.082)

(0.017)

(0.009)

Female x Fem.Manager

0.360

0.394

0.403

-1.384

-0.524

-1.058

(0.150)

(0.179)

(0.201)

(0.168)

(0.562)

(0.267)

Performancelag
Rank Alag
Round
Constant
Observations
Controls
Clusters
R-squared

Number of angry emoticons sent
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.710
1.120*
1.123**
1.384*

0.015

0.013

0.105***

0.079

(0.140)

(0.222)

(0.009)

(0.138)

-0.127

-0.106

-0.699

-0.740

(0.223)

(0.294)

(0.180)

(0.135)

0.009

0.012

0.002

-0.001

0.313**

0.303**

0.219

0.207

(0.707)

(0.642)

(0.941)

(0.986)

(0.020)

(0.033)

(0.266)

(0.285)

0.327***

0.358***

0.217

0.500

1.602***

1.386***

-0.000

-1.676

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.311)

(0.245)

(0.003)

(0.010)

(1.000)

(0.617)

175
No
35
0.049

175
No
35
0.067

140
No
35
0.088

140
Yes
35
0.110

79
No
29
0.117

79
No
29
0.151

64
No
27
0.255

64
Yes
27
0.369

OLS regressions. Standard errros clustered at the group level. Robust pval in parentheses. *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Figure 2.1: The stages of the experiment

Figure 2.2: The decision to be manager by treatment and gender
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Figure 2.3: The decision to be a manager by performance tercile

Figure 2.4: Average number of messages of each kind sent to Rank A and Rank B workers.
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Figure 2.5: Average number of angry emoticons received by managers.
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CHAPTER 3
DEGREES OF EQUALITY: WHY ARE THERE FEWER WOMEN IN
UNDERGRADUATE ECONOMICS?

3.1. Introduction
Recent reports suggest that women constitute roughly 58 percent of all undergraduate
students Siegfried (2012). In fact, female college students are currently 37 percent less likely
than males to obtain a bachelor’s degree in science, technology, engineering, and math, and
comprise only 25 percent of the STEM workforce (Carrell et al. (2009)). Similarly, for every
female economics major, today there are almost 2.9 male majors nationwide. Percentage of
women undergraduates in economics remains around 30-35 percent for decades creating a
bottleneck in the pipeline of female economists. There has been some literature addressing
the continuing concerns of why women are not majoring in such quantitatively heavy fields
to the same degree as their male counterparts. Given the current under-representation
of women in such courses across the United States, understanding the decisions made by
students to pursue a major in college becomes imperative.
Undergraduate field of choice is typically seen as an intermediate step in the transition
to professional fields or to advanced academic study. Multitude of factors affect a student’s
decision to choose a major (or not) such as information, competition, career aspirations,
interests, presence of same gender peers, presence of same gender role models, pedagogical
choices, family background, self confidence and perceptions about future earnings (Dynan
and Rouse (1997); Hughes (2000); Jensen and Owen (2001)). Evidence suggests that most
of these factors affect men and women differently. Given this fact, we want to examine
specifically how information and preferences might matter for their decisions in the choice
of major. Through a randomized field experiment on the incoming class of female students
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who have been offered admission in Dedman College at Southern Methodist University, we
try to test the the impact of whether information matters in women picking a field of study
and if so, what kind of information and the mode of conveyance. It has been argued women
are more socially minded than men and may be driven more by intrinsic motivations rather
than extrinsic. In this paper, using economics as an example of a math intensive field which
records a marked gender gap, we try to capture whether attitudes of women towards choice
of majors are in fact affected by the kind of information they receive and in the process
understand the aforementioned preferences and motivations that drive women.
3.2 Literature Review
Both non-experimental and experimental literature posit a number of reasons for this
gender gap. While some papers have directly addressed particular concerns with fewer
women as majors in math intensive fields, some address more general concerns of factors like
perceived success in labor force, productivity, preferences and labor market earnings and
discrimination driving gender differences. Emerson et al. (2012), in their empirical paper
using undergraduate student data from a number of colleges, find that a smaller percentage
of women take economics at all levels—introductory courses, theory courses, and majoring
in economics. We throw light on some of the factors that we think are more relevant to our
analysis.
Information and Labor Market Opportunities
Information in general and in particular about final labor force opportunities and future
success in the labor force may help explain gender differences at the undergraduate level
better. The fact that information and more importantly, the kind of information provided
may affect attitudes and opinions of students has been highlighted by Greene et al. (1982)
in their paper. They conducted an experiment with 288 ninth grade students in which they
read job descriptions derived from interviews with people who have careers that are nontraditional for their sex. A male and female experimenter conducted the study during regularly
scheduled classes. 72 males and 72 females were randomly assigned to the experimental
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group and half to a control group. Students in the experimental group were given career
information packets containing an introductory passage and a set of four job descriptions.
Equal numbers of male and female students read each job descriptions. The students were
instructed to read each page in the packet and when they finished reading, they filled up an
occupation survey distributed to them. This survey was designed to measure student attitudes about the appropriateness for both men and women of the jobs. They were directed
to mark response they thought best completed the sentence for each job - I think this job is
appropriate for: men, women, both men women. Students in the control group completed
the occupation survey first and were then given career-information packets to read. They
found that students thought it more appropriate for women to enter traditionally male careers rather than for males to enter traditionally female careers. They conclude that students
attitudes towards sex-typed careers can be changed by exposure to career information containing non-stereotyped information and non-traditional role models. The extent to which
these attitudes may change or the kind of information that leads to sustainable attitude
changes is thus worthy of further research.
Turner and Bowen (1999) use data on 1951, 1976 and 1989 entering cohorts from 34
colleges and universities and employing a decomposition strategy (decomposing the predicted
probability of choosing a field), they estimate a logit model to see the importance of SAT
scores in explaining differences in the majors chosen by men and women. They assert that
there are three sets of differences: total observed differences in the actual distributions
of scores, differences attributable to differences between women and men and the remaining
differences that are attributable to differences in preferences and other forces. They find that
in economics and psychology, differences between women and men in SAT scores explain only
a very small part of the gender gap (about 16% in economics and less than 8% in psychology).
Instead, it is mostly the differences in preferences and labor market expectations and other
residual forces that generate large gender differences in representation in these fields. On
similar lines, Kahn (1995) discounts the hypothesis that math is an important force behind
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the under-representation of women among undergraduate economics majors pointing out
that math as a major has a higher proportion of women than economics. Dynan and Rouse
(1997) use regression analysis to find that although their Harvard samples suggest that
female students tend to have somewhat weaker math skills than their male counterparts,
math background appears to have little influence on students’ decisions about whether to
take introductory economics in their first year and explains only a limited part of the gender
difference in the decisions of first-year students to major in economics after they have taken
the introductory course. Thus, although we have evidence of there being a gender gap in
math aptitude and that possibly affecting the uptake of math intensive fields like STEM and
economics, the gender gap in aptitude might not explain the gender gap in choice of fields.
Montmarquette et al. (2002) find that students seem to generally be highly motivated
in their choice of major by the possibilities of higher earnings in future. This perceived
probability of success in a college major on the choice of major thus has important policy
implications. They use data from NLSY and employ probit models for business, liberal
arts, science and education fields to estimate determinants of the probability of success in
each of the four concentrations. From the coefficients of these probit, they compute ’a
perceived probability of success in each major’. These computed probabilities are based on
the probabilities of success of students with particular abilities, personal and socioeconomic
characteristics. They term these probabilities as perceived because they assume that students
with particular characteristics (for instance, women) and abilities recognize that, as a group
or individuals, they have a different probability of success in a given major than students
with other characteristics and abilities. Their result shows that for female students of any
major, the perceived probability of success in education dominates all other probabilities.
Further they compute an idiosyncratic expected earnings variable (using regression coefficient
estimates from another study (Rumberger and Thomas (1993)) on the economic returns to
college majors) for the same sample and segregate it by gender. Their estimated model
confirms that expected earnings is essential for the choice of a major but the impact is
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characterized by significant differences by gender and race. Firstly, their results strongly
support the hypothesis that students choose majors with the highest expected earnings.
Secondly, they suggest that a man is significantly more likely to choose science rather than
education. Additionally, in the fields of science and business, prior information and family
experience with college play a role in the student’s choice of major. Thirdly, from their
estimation of a mixed multinomial logit model segregated by gender, they find a statistically
significant impact of the expected earnings variable to be twice as great for men than for
women reflecting the willingness of women to go into nontraditional careers. An alternative
explanation they provide is that women drop out for reasons related to nonacademic problems
thus they assert that the probability of success is less important to them in selecting a major.
Preferences
In the literature, women tend to display more pro-social behavior and non-pecuniary
aspects of motivation matter (see Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Benabou and Tirole (2003),
Delfgaauw and Dur (2004), Dixit (2005), Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), Prendergast
(2001), and Seabright (2002)). For instance, women have been found to be more other
regarding than men in the non-strategic dictator game (see Eckel and Grossman (1998),
Bolton and Katok (1995)). On similar lines, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) manipulate
the cost–benefit ratio of giving money to a recipient and find that women are more concerned with equalizing earnings between the parties. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) look
at gender effects in a team dictator game and find that female majority groups are more
likely to implement equal splits. Employment in services such as health care, nongovernmental organizations, education, leisure, and other services account for more than four in
ten women’s jobs (nationally 43.2 percent), but only one in four men’s jobs (24.8 percent)
(Bureau (2013)). Role of pro-social preferences may explain the self-selection of individuals
into public sector or not-for-profit organizations, in particular in the delivery of social services (see Besley and Ghatak (2003), Delfgaauw (2007), Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008),
Kolstad and Lindkvist (2012) and Serra et al. (2011)). Such evidence drives us to explore
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the aspect that women might be motivated by pro-social behavior in our study by having
a treatment giving women information about non-traditional, more pro-social careers that
can be achieved with an economics degree. Hence, we are making sure women know they
can get a job more aligned with their preferences, if indeed they self-select into jobs of such
nature.
Role models
Another determinant of a student’s choice of major might be the presence or absence of
role models. Students uncertain about whether they will do well in highly competitive fields
may be reassured if they observe someone with similar characteristics who is accomplished
in the field. To this end, female teachers, college faculty, and females in competitive career
positions have important influences on female students in regard to decisions, achievements
and successes (Tidball (1973), Basow and Howe (1980), Rask and Bailey (2002)). However,
Canes and Rosen (1995) in their paper analyzed panel data from Princeton University, University of Michigan, and Whittier College and found no evidence that an increase in the share
of women on a department’s faculty led to an increase in its share of female majors. Similar
to these findings, Bettinger and Long (2005) carry out an econometric exercise to study if
faculty serve as role models for female students in quantitative, technical and science-related
fields. They find mixed effects of female instructors on the interests of female students or
major choice. However, women students who initially had a female faculty member were
found to be more likely to take an additional course than other female students. Carrell et
al. (2009) confirms similar results using data from United States Air Force Academy. While
professor gender is found to have little impact on male students, it has a powerful effect on
high performing female students’ performance in math and science classes, their likelihood
of taking future math and science courses, and their likelihood of graduating with a STEM
degree. Cheryan et al. (2011) test this common assumption that female role models improve
women’s beliefs that they can be successful in STEM fields through experiments that varied
role model gender and whether role models embody computer science stereotypes. They find

87

that for women who have already chosen the domain, female role models improve women’s attitudes toward STEM but when it comes to recruiting women into STEM, role model gender
may make less of a difference than whether role models fit stereotypes that are incompatible
with the female gender role. Contrary to this, Lockwood (2006) experiment using data on
introductory psychology students with interests ranging from computer programming to law,
teaching and engineering indicated that female participants were more inspired by outstanding female than male role models. Moreover, higher female representation in leadership roles
may also accelerate gender equality both in the short run, by attracting high-ability women
to such roles, and in the long run, by exposing society to female leadership and accelerating
changes in social norms (Beaman et al. (2012)). Almquist and Angrist (1971) suggested
that as a first and primary group, the potential of a family influence as a role model is quite
strong. They tested if family has some influence on their children’s career choices. Using
student interviews they found a strong association between career salience and maternal
employment suggesting that mothers have an impact as role models too.
All these studies seem to imply that role models definitely have an impact on females
students in one way or the other, although mixed results suggest that it is difficult to unequivocally claim that the impact is effective in terms of influencing initial college major
choices or recruiting women in math intensive fields.
Peer Effects
Arguments based on impacts of peers are considered relevant for several aspects like educational costs, distance learning, affirmative action and on the effects of voucher systems
Winston and Zimmerman (2004). The relevance of peer effects to economics of higher education however has only recently been acknowledged (see Rothschild and White (1995),
Winston and Yen (1995), Epple et al. (2001)). Most papers with peer effects have a small
empirical basis since it is difficult to measure. Literature on peer effects thus largely pertains to the most measurable aspects of education which is grade performance and academic
ability. There remains a rich set of questions to be answered on how broadly peer effects
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operate among students in colleges. Little work has been done in trying to capture whether
peers matter for decisions like college choices or choices of major. To this end, we introduce
a variation in one of our treatments where the same information is provided by a younger
economics student.
3.3 Experiment Design
Given sufficient evidence of prevalent gender differences in the choices of majors in more
quantitatively intensive fields and the fact that choosing these concentrations is a decision
under uncertainty influenced by several factors, we believe that kind of information provided
to the female students taking initial decisions about their choice of majors as well as how the
information is provided to them matters critically. With this intervention, we attempt to
capture whether information about higher salaries with traditional careers in such fields or
alternative career paths induce a change in the aforementioned decision for women. Our prior
is that women are more likely to aspire to such jobs, yet they do not necessarily associate
them with the economics major. We also introduce a variation in the source of information
to see which has a greater impact. Similar to the STEM fields, Economics is also widely
accepted as a gender skewed major in undergraduate course with acute under-representation
of women. Taking economics as a case to determine which of these variations reveal the
greatest impact on women’s decisions, we propose the following intervention.
Our intervention in this experimental study entails targeting high school female students
who have been accepted to Dedman College, SMU to begin in the Fall semester of 2016.
These female students are randomly selected into four treatment groups:
• (T1) Flyer giving general course information + Women in Economics Club
• (T2) Flyer giving general course information + wage prospects information + Women
in Economics Club
• (T3) Flyer giving general course information + social jobs information + Women in
Economics Club
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• (T4) Peer giving general course information + social jobs information + Women in
Economics Club through a video
D1=(T2-T1) represents impact of giving wage information on the induction of women
into an economics program
D2=(T3-T1) represents impact of giving information about the nature and objective of
jobs on the induction of women into an economics program
D1 v/s D2 indicates emphasizing which component of information matters more in women
taking up economics. Do women give more importance to salary expectations or job characteristics in choosing majors?
(T4-T2) represents which source of information is more important. Do peers giving
information have a higher impact on the induction of women into an economics program?
We generate random numbers between 1 to 4 at the distinct school level and merged this
with the individual level admissions data. This assigned random numbers to each individual
making sure students from the same school were assigned to the same treatment group.
Hence, we randomize on the basis of schools to minimize such interaction and also to allow
for comparisons with student choices historically from the same schools. We then sorted our
merged data first by Dedman divisions and then by our treatment groups. This made sure
that each Dedman division had all 4 treatment groups.1 All the four groups of students who
accept the admission offered to them by SMU are sent a welcome email. This email contains
a welcome message in the following format with a flyer or a video based on the treatment.2
1

The intervention could allow us to compare the number of girls who take up economics as a major over
different time periods.
2

Information provided on the flyer as well as the video would be visible on the email itself since we
consider that would have a greater probability of being read/watched rather than including a URL link to
be clicked. The detailed treatment flyers can be found in the Appendix.
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“Dear —————
Welcome to SMU!
Congratulations on being accepted into Southern Methodist University.
We want to take this opportunity to say how excited we are looking ahead at you joining
the SMU Dedman family and having a productive and fun-filled experience.....
We hope you enjoy learning about our Economics major!”
3.4 Empirical strategy
As outlined above, using the information on students from different schools and their
application into Dedman I, II and III, our treatment took place at distinct school level. We
assigned four treatments to each distinct school, to which the students belonged. This is
done to ensure that girls from the same school get the same treatment i.e. email containing
the same flyer so that there is no contamination or confounding in case they communicate
with each other. Consequently, we sorted the data by Dedman division and by treatment
group to ensure every Dedman division has all four treatment groups such that they are
balanced. We use the following model for an optimum estimation strategy:

Yi = β0 + β1 dT + δXi + εi

We examine the effect of our treatment on an intermediate outcome variables that can
show the pathway to choosing a major, or the student’s interest in the economics major i.e.
actual enrollment into economics courses. Our outcome variables are the following. First,
we consider if the student enrolled in any principles course in any semester (fall or spring)
in any academic year (2016-17 and 2017-18). We call this outcome tookany. Second, we
consider whether the student enrolled in principles courses in the the year 2016 - 17 and
in the following academic year 2017 - 18, either in Fall or Spring. We call these outcomes
tookyear16-17 and tookyear17-18. Third, we consider if the student enrolled in principles
of microeconomics (course code 1311) and principles of macroeconomics (course code 1312)
separately. We call these outcomes took1311 and took1312. These outcome variables take
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the value 1 if they do enroll in any aforementioned economics courses and 0 otherwise. Given
that Yi is binary in nature, the model is estimated using a Probit model. dT is a dummy
equal to 1 she is in a treatment group and 0 if in she is in the control group. Xi is a vector
of demographic controls for the students.Depending on the heterogeneity of the sample, Xi
may include many other controls such as age, nationality, high school GPA, scholarships
received, parental income, parental job, parental educational background, prior economics
classes taken in high school, grade in economics classes in high school, friends’ choice of
major, expected annual earnings after college, intended choice of work (Social/Non-social),
whether they want to take any further economics course and high school fixed effects.3 For
this analysis, we control for the Dedman division in which the student is enrolled. β1 is
the parameter of interest here that measures the effect of treatment on the likelihood of
enrolling into a principles of economics course in the undergraduate program. Standard
errors are robust standard errors.
3.5 Implementation
Given the lack of availability of historical information on admission offers and take up
rates broken down by gender from the SMU admissions office, we conducted this study as a
pilot to estimate what take up rates would be necessary for a full-scale study. Our interventions were well-designed and we identified certain caveats in the process of implementation
which need to addressed in the full-scale study. We worked with the SMU admissions office
to identify our sample, randomize and send out our treatment emails. We collected students’ enrolment into principles and intermediate economics classes in subsequent semesters
at SMU. We also approached the National Student Clearinghouse database to use their
3

Depending on access to individual level demographic data, we can extend this analysis to include
interactions between treatment groups and some of the controls such as cumulative high school grade, and
high school grade in economics to get heterogenous effects of the treatment by varying academic performances
of students.
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StudentTracker service to track the major choices of the treated females who were offered
admission in SMU but took admission in other colleges.4 .
3.6 Results
Treatment 1 (T1) forms the control group that is provided general information about
economics courses in an email. Treatment 2 (T2) is the group that is provided information
about wage/salary prospects after an Economics degree in an email. Treatment 3 (T3) is
the group that is provided information on non-conventional or alternative socially oriented
jobs that students can get after an Economics degree in an email. Treatment 4 (T4) is the
group that receives the same information as T3 but through a video.
In Tables 3.1 through 3.4, we present probit regressions looking at the effect of our
treatments on the students’ likelihood of taking Economics principles classes in subsequent
semesters and years. In all tables, we run six separate Probit estimations such that columns
(1) through (6) depict the likelihood of enrolling into any micro (course code 1311) or macro
(course code 1312) principles course in any semester in any academic year 2016-17 or 2017-18
given by (tookany); enrolling into both micro and macro principles courses in any academic
year (tookboth); enrolling into any principles course in the year 2016-17 given by (yr16-17);
enrolling into any principles course the year 2017-18 given by (year17-18); enrolling into principles of microeconomics given by (1311); and enrolling into principles of macroeconomics
given by (1312) respectively. Given that we use a Probit model for estimation, we cannot
simple interpret the intercepts. Therefore, we report and interpret the marginal effects.
From Table 3.1, we find that none of the treatments have a statistically significant effect of
increasing student’s probability of taking any principles classes as compared to the baseline.
T2 and T4 don’t have a statistically significant effect on increasing the students’ likelihood
of taking micro or macro classes in any semester or year compared to control. This holds
true even with the inclusion of Dedman division controls in Table 3.2. However, we do find
that T3 has a statistically significant effect of reducing the probability of taking principles
4

See https://www.studentclearinghouse.org/
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classes in year 2017-2018 and macro (1312) in particular. In Table 3.2, after including
the Dedman controls, we find that T3 has a statistically significant effect on reducing the
students’ likelihood of taking micro or macro classes in any semester or year compared to
control.
From Table 3.2, we also see that when controls for the Dedman divisions, Dedman 1
and Dedman 2 are included in the regression, Dedman 2 has a statistically significant and
positive effect on students’ likelihood of taking principles classes. This makes sense since
Dedman 2 is Dedman division offering Econ majors at SMU.
In Table 3.3, we interact T3 with Dedman 2 and find that for students enrolled in Dedman
2, T3 reduces the probability of taking Econ courses for cols 1,2, 4 and 5. In Table 3.4, we
interact T4 with Dedman 2 (same info as T3 but by video) we find no statistically significant
negative effect on students’ (enrolled in Dedman 2) likelihood of enrolling in principles classes.
Foremost, it seems simply reaching out to women and giving them course information
about economics has as much of an impact as giving them course information and additional
information on wages or socially oriented career prospects. This could either be a result of
too much information or the fact that they stop reading.
With T3, we aim to test whether providing information about the socially oriented jobs
that one could get with an economics degree could induce more women to take econ classes
and choose the major. While our prior is that women are more likely to aspire to such jobs,
yet they do not necessarily associate them with the economics major, we find that T3 (where
we provide this information via a flyer) actually reduces the female students’ likelihood of
enrolling in principles classes. However, once that same message comes from their peers,
this negative impact is reversed. Once we break the enrollment down into Principle of
Microeconomics (ECO1311) and Principles of Macroeconomics (ECO1312) individually, we
find a similar trend. This reinforces our belief that peer information and interaction matter
greatly in women’s decisions of choice of courses and choices of majors.5 With a bigger sample
5

Relevance of peer effects to economics of higher education however has only recently been acknowledged
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size and with the ability to track students’ reading the intervention emails and watching the
peer videos, we also believe we will be able to see a statistically significant effect of providing
information on social job prospects with an Econ major.6
We had treated 1075 students but had only 260 finally enrolled in SMU. This led to
us losing track of 76% of our treated sample and greatly affected our power calculations.
Consequently, we approached the National Student Clearinghouse database to use their
StudentTracker service to track the major choices of the treated females who were offered
admission in SMU but took admission in other colleges. NSC’s Student Tracker database
maintains records of all undergraduate students pertaining to their enrollments and degrees
in the US. However, this database does not contain information on the classes students enrol
in. This again affected our sample size and power calculations since enrolment into any
economics course is one of our main outcome variables.7 We discuss our future strategy for
the full scale study in Section 3.7.
3.7 Strategy for the full scale study
This pilot exercise provided the intended learning opportunity about implementing the
full scale study in the future. This intervention is easily scalable in university settings,
provided we have access to information on historical admissions and enrolment rates, broken
down by gender and the ability to track email receipts as well as students, post intervention.
(Rothschild and White 1995, Winston and Yen 1995, Epple et al. 2001). Little work has been done in trying
to capture whether peers matter for decisions like college choices or choices of major.
6
Since we could not access information on historical admission offers and take up rates, broken down by
gender, at SMU, we assess the mean sample size required for power calculations in Section 7 for the full-scale
study to be implemented in the future. Further, we were not allowed by the SMU Admissions Office to place
trackers in the emails to check whether students read the emails or clicked on the links. This might explain
the deviation from the expected effects of our treatments in the pilot.
7

Since students mostly declare their major in their Sophomore or Senior year of college and we carried
out our intervention in 2016, we requested this data in summer 2019. We requested data on the choice of
majors of the 1075 treated students. We received this data from the NSC on student’s major choices, which
we merged with our initial intervention sample of treated 1075 students. We expected this would give us
a final sample with complete information on major choices of 1075 students who were offered admission at
SMU as opposed to only the initial sample of 260 who actually enrolled in SMU’s Dedman College. However,
we found that only 30 students declared Economics as a primary or secondary major in the sample and there
were 40 students with undeclared majors. This gave us insufficient information to capture our full sample.
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The size of the university and the number of students enrolling in economics certainly plays
an important role in us teasing out of the effects of the intervention.
Given that our pilot study at SMU had an admissions take up rate of 24 percent, the full
study at SMU would require treatment emails to be sent to approximately 4300 students.8
Assuming similar take up rates in subsequent years, this would give us a sample of 1040
students coming in to SMU and we would have around 260 students in each treatment group.
Since we lack historical information on rates of selection into economics classes, our pilot
study informs us that 31.5% of admitted students took any economics classes at SMU. This
gives us a benchmark for the rate of selection for the full scale study.
Given the lack of historical information, we needed to estimate the rates of selection into
SMU Dedman School in general and economics in particular prior to conducting a full study.
It was also worth testing to make sure the emails work and there are no other problems
with the design before scaling it up to the likely size it would take to do the study well. We
used the rate of selection into Economics we found in our pilot to estimate the total sample
size we would need for a full scale study at SMU. This is easily achievable in a large public
university setting anywhere or using a group of smaller schools in a particular geographic
region in case we do not have an admissions year with 4000 students being offered admissions
to SMU Dedman School.

8

We sent 1075 treatment emails and retained 260 students at SMU in our pilot. In each treatment we
ended up with 65 female students. The coefficient for effect of T4 on female enrolment is plausible (a positive
interaction of 0.060 (≈ 0.1) in Table 3.2 for instance), but it is not statistically significant—a simple power
calculation reveals the sample size that is necessary to achieve 90% power at β=0.1 and σ=0.35.
n=

σ 2 (Zα + Zβ )2
µ2

(1.645 + 1.28)2
0.12
This gives us n=105 for each treatment group which means a sample of (260*4) i.e.1040 female students
actually taking up admission in SMU would be a large enough sample for the coefficient on the interaction
to be statistically significant. Assuming a similar selection rate into SMU in subsequent years, we estimate
sending 4300 treatment emails and having 1040 female students taking up admission at SMU for a full scale
study.
n = (0.35)2
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3.8 Conclusion
Evidence suggests that women do not major in quantitatively heavy fields to the same
degree as their male counterparts. Given this current under-representation of women in such
courses across the United States, we attempt a long-term study to understand the decisions
made by students to pursue a major in college. Due to lack of availability of historical information on admission offers and take up rates, broken down by gender, from the SMU,
we conducted this randomized field experiment on the sample of incoming female students
to Southern Methodist University in 2016 as a pilot to estimate what take up rates would
be necessary for a full-scale study. Through this pilot, we also test whether information
provided matters in women picking a field of study and if so, what kind of information
and the mode of dissemination. Women are known to be more social minded than men
and may be driven more by intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic. Alternately, they
might be driven by salary expectations in labor market outcomes. Using economics as an
example of a quantitatively intensive field which records a marked gender gap, we try to
capture whether attitudes of women towards their choice of majors are in fact affected by
the kind of information they receive about the course. In this process, we also attempt understand the aforementioned preferences and motivations that drive women. Concomitantly,
we try to quantify peer influence in driving women’s major choices by varying the source of
information.
We work closely with the SMU admissions office to implement our email interventions. We
randomize and send 1075 female high school students, who had received admission to SMU’s
Dedman College, one of four treatment emails. T1 is the control group that is provided
general information about economics courses, T2 is the group that is provided information
about wage/salary prospects after an Economics degree, T3 is the group that is provided
information on a variety of socially oriented jobs - e.g., international organizations, policy
research institutes, non-governmental organizations - that one could get with an economics
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major, and T4 is the group that receives the same information as T3 but through a video
(instead of a flyer) showing the experiences of current female economics majors.
We examine the effect of these treatments on female students’ likelihood of enrolling in
principles of economics courses using regression analysis. We find simply reaching out to
women and giving them course information via flyer about economics has as much of an
impact as giving them course information and additional information on wages or socially
oriented career prospects. We find, contrary to expectations, providing women information
on socially oriented jobs available with an econ major actually reduces the likelihood of
women enrolling into economics courses. However, when we provide the same information
from peers, this negative impact is reversed.
The pilot helped us identify important issues to successfully conduct a full scale study
in future. First, we found the rate of selection into SMU is fairly low. Around 24 percent
of the students who had received the intervention finally took up admission in SMU. This
helped us estimate the sample size needed for the full scale study at SMU assuming similar
rates of selection. Second, SMU admission office’s privacy policies did not allow us to use
email trackers to check which emails were read. We are unable to say if the students are
discouraged from reading the emails due to too much information or whether they click
on the video attached to the emails for T4. We believe that the effect of information and
peers on students’ decisions to major in Economics merits more empirical work. To this
end, we plan to conduct a full scale intervention on a larger sample incorporating email
trackers. This study is easily scalable in a large public university setting in both developed
and developing countries. It is also easily achievable using a group of smaller schools in a
particular geographic region in case we do not have the intended sample size at any particular
school. This will further research in the area with potential for deep insights not only in
undergraduate Economics but other such quantitatively intensive fields.
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Table 3.1: Effect of Treatments on taking Principles Classes
(1)
(2)
tookany tookboth
T2
T3
T4

Observations

(3)
yr1617

(4)
yr1718

(5)
1311

(6)
1312

-0.086

0.028

-0.055

-0.035

-0.038

-0.048

(0.283)

(0.635)

(0.475)

(0.473)

(0.637)

(0.460)

-0.115

-0.042

-0.140*

-0.004

-0.067

-0.113*

(0.148)

(0.464)

(0.065)

(0.939)

(0.400)

(0.081)

-0.004

0.079

0.032

-0.034

0.033

0.040

(0.962)

(0.135)

(0.649)

(0.447)

(0.649)

(0.507)

260

260

260

260

260

260

Robust p values are reported in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Marginal effects from a Probit estimation are reported.The dependent variables
are all binary indicators. Dependent variable in Col. (1) = 1 if student enrolled
into any principles of economics course (ECO1311 or ECO1312) in any semester
in any academic year (2016-17 or 2017-18), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, col. (2) = 1
if student enrolled into both micro and macro principles courses in any academic
year. Col. (3) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2016-17.
Col. (4) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2017-18.
Col. (5) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of microeconomics (ECO1311).
Col. (6) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of macroeconomics (ECO1312).
T2 is the treatment where information about wage prospects after an Econ
major is provided. T3 is the treatment where information about social job
prospects after an Economics major is provided. T4 is the treatment where
the same information is conveyed through a video.
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Table 3.2: Effect of Treatments on taking Principles Classes w Dedman controls

T2
T3
T4
Dedman1
Dedman2

Observations

(1)
tookany

(2)
tookboth

(3)
yr1617

(4)
yr1718

(5)
1311

(6)
1312

-0.101

0.020

-0.071

-0.031

-0.051

-0.053

(0.206)

(0.733)

(0.353)

(0.522)

(0.526)

(0.419)

-0.135*

-0.051

-0.161**

-0.007

-0.089

-0.123*

(0.094)

(0.363)

(0.036)

(0.882)

(0.272)

(0.057)

-0.029

0.060

0.003

-0.038

0.006

0.019

(0.692)

(0.231)

(0.966)

(0.392)

(0.931)

(0.744)

0.076

0.034

0.079

0.079

0.101

0.089

(0.406)

(0.586)

(0.381)

(0.186)

(0.262)

(0.257)

0.161**

0.079*

0.191***

0.011

0.160**

0.111**

(0.013)

(0.065)

(0.003)

(0.787)

(0.012)

(0.042)

260

260

260

260

260

260

Robust p values are reported in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Marginal effects from a Probit estimation are reported. Dedman divisions have
been included as controls. The dependent variables are all binary indicators.
Dependent variable in Col. (1) = 1 if student enrolled into any principles of
economics course (ECO1311 or ECO1312) in any semester in any academic
year (2016-17 or 2017-18), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, col. (2) = 1 if student
enrolled into both micro and macro principles courses in any academic year.
Col. (3) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2016-17.
Col. (4) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2017-18.
Col. (5) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of microeconomics (ECO1311).
Col. (6) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of macroeconomics (ECO1312).
T2 is the treatment where information about wage prospects after an
Economics major is provided. T3 is the treatment where information about social
job prospects after an Economics major is provided. T4 is the treatment where
where the same information is conveyed through a video.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Treatments on taking Principles Classes w T3*Dedman interaction

T2
T3
T4
Dedman1
Dedman2
T3XDed2

Observations

(1)
tookany

(2)
tookboth

(3)
yr1617

(4)
yr1718

(5)
1311

(6)
1312

-0.110

0.017

-0.078

-0.035

-0.060

-0.056

(0.169)

(0.768)

(0.310)

(0.456)

(0.456)

(0.384)

0.002

-0.004

-0.044

0.044

0.049

-0.038

(0.983)

(0.959)

(0.649)

(0.479)

(0.628)

(0.642)

-0.039

0.056

-0.004

-0.040

-0.003

0.014

(0.604)

(0.258)

(0.956)

(0.359)

(0.970)

(0.813)

0.064

0.030

0.066

0.073

0.090

0.078

(0.473)

(0.622)

(0.443)

(0.208)

(0.309)

(0.293)

0.231***

0.097**

0.246***

0.042

0.228***

0.149**

(0.001)

(0.033)

(0.000)

(0.355)

(0.001)

(0.010)

-0.266**

-0.084

-0.229**

-0.088

-0.251**

-0.169*

(0.017)

(0.269)

(0.035)

(0.134)

(0.019)

(0.062)

260

260

260

260

260

260

Robust p values are reported in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Marginal effects from a Probit estimation are reported. Dedman divisions have
been included as controls. The dependent variables are all binary indicators.
Dependent variable in Col. (1) = 1 if student enrolled into any principles of
economics course (ECO1311 or ECO1312) in any semester in any academic
year (2016-17 or 2017-18), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, col. (2) = 1 if student
enrolled into both micro and macro principles courses in any academic year.
Col. (3) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2016-17.
Col. (4) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2017-18.
Col. (5) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of microeconomics (ECO1311).
Col. (6) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of macroeconomics (ECO1312).
T2 is the treatment where information about wage prospects after an
Economics major is provided. T3 is the treatment where information about social
job prospects after an Economics major is provided. T4 is the treatment where
where the same information is conveyed through a video.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Treatments on taking Principles Classes w T4*Dedman interaction

T2
T3
T4
Dedman1
Dedman2
T4XDed2

Observations

(1)
tookany

(2)
tookboth

(3)
yr1617

(4)
yr1718

(5)
1311

(6)
1312

-0.099

0.029

-0.070

-0.032

-0.047

-0.047

(0.216)

(0.609)

(0.362)

(0.501)

(0.559)

(0.468)

-0.133*

-0.043

-0.160**

-0.008

-0.086

-0.120*

(0.099)

(0.426)

(0.038)

(0.872)

(0.289)

(0.063)

-0.049

-0.030

-0.009

-0.027

-0.033

-0.041

(0.584)

(0.613)

(0.913)

(0.609)

(0.713)

(0.566)

0.079

0.053

0.081

0.076

0.107

0.101

(0.388)

(0.399)

(0.370)

(0.196)

(0.236)

(0.200)

0.145*

0.014

0.181**

0.019

0.132*

0.064

(0.056)

(0.786)

(0.015)

(0.676)

(0.079)

(0.329)

0.051

0.258**

0.029

-0.029

0.097

0.158

(0.700)

(0.029)

(0.812)

(0.705)

(0.461)

(0.184)

260

260

260

260

260

260

Robust p values are reported in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Marginal effects from a Probit estimation are reported. Dedman divisions have
been included as controls. The dependent variables are all binary indicators.
Dependent variable in Col. (1) = 1 if student enrolled into any principles of
economics course (ECO1311 or ECO1312) in any semester in any academic
year (2016-17 or 2017-18), and 0 otherwise. Similarly, col. (2) = 1 if student
enrolled into both micro and macro principles courses in any academic year.
Col. (3) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2016-17.
Col. (4) = 1 if student enrolled into principles courses in the year 2017-18.
Col. (5) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of microeconomics (ECO1311).
Col. (6) = 1 if student enrolled in principles of macroeconomics (ECO1312).
T2 is the treatment where information about wage prospects after an
Economics major is provided. T3 is the treatment where information about social
job prospects after an Economics major is provided. T4 is the treatment where
where the same information is conveyed through a video.
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Dear Josh,
Welcome to SMU! I want to take this opportunity to tell you how excited we are at the
possibility that you might be joining our Dedman family. We understand how important
choosing a field of study is. This is why I would like to direct your attention to our economics
program. Here is some information that you might find useful:
Figure 3.1: Treatment Email (T2): Info on Wage Prospects

Best,
SMU
Dedman Office of Undergraduate Recruiting
dedmancollege@smu.edu
214-768-2532
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Dear Josh,
Welcome to SMU! I want to take this opportunity to tell you how excited we are at the
possibility that you might be joining our Dedman family. We understand how important
choosing a field of study is. This is why I would like to direct your attention to our economics
program. Here is some information that you might find useful:
Figure 3.2: Treatment Email (T3): Info on Socially Oriented Jobs

Best,
SMU
Dedman Office of Undergraduate Recruiting
dedmancollege@smu.edu
214-768-2532
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Dear Josh,
Welcome to SMU! I want to take this opportunity to tell you how excited we are at the
possibility that you might be joining our Dedman family. We understand how important
choosing a field of study is. This is why I would like to direct your attention to our economics
program. Here is some information that you might find useful:
Figure 3.3: Treatment Email (T4): Info from Peers

Best,
SMU
Dedman Office of Undergraduate Recruiting
dedmancollege@smu.edu
214-768-2532
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APPENDIX

Table A.1: Subjects’ characteristics
Male

Age
STEM-Bus-Econ (frequency)
Native speaker (frequency)
Past Leadership (frequency)
Big 5 Agreeableness Index

Female

T1
22.61

T2
22.84

T3
22.55

All
22.66

T1
23.32

T2
22.19

T3
22.00

All
22.50

(2.49)

(2.87)

(4.63)

(3.48)

(4.51)

(3.09)

(4.27)

(4.01)

0.85

0.91

0.80

0.85

0.71

0.67

0.66

0.68

(0.36)

(0.29

(0.41)

(0.36)

(0.46)

(0.48)

(0.48)

(0.47)

0.34

0.26

0.47

0.36

0.41

0.43

0.56

0.47

(0.48)

(0.44)

(0.50)

(0.48)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.50)

(0.50)

0.80

0.85

0.83

0.82

0.90

0.83

0.83

0.85

(0.40)

(0.36)

(0.38)

(0.38)

(0.30)

(0.38)

(0.38)

(0.35)

27.80

26.67

27.70

27.44

29.44

28.34

29.95

29.29

(5.05)

(5.53)

(5.19)

(5.24)

(7.26)

(6.78)

(5.21)

(6.44)
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M=F
(All)
p-value
0.712
0.000***
0.066
0.498
0.007***

Table A.2: Performance in the real effort task

(1)
Female

Dep. Variable: Number of correctly solved puzzled
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

0.569

0.578

0.059

-0.064

-0.732

(0.418)

(0.411)

(0.963)

(0.882)

(0.306)

0.112

-0.332

-0.133

-0.399

(0.894)

(0.755)

(0.798)

(0.561)

0.584

0.386

0.410

-0.118

(0.488)

(0.717)

(0.419)

(0.865)

Choice (T2)
Choice&Messages (T3)
Female x T2
Female x T3

1.074

0.664

(0.539)

(0.524)

0.492

1.332

(0.778)

(0.180)

Manager
Stage
Constant
Observations

R

2

3.891***

3.882***

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.380***

0.380***

(0.000)

(0.000)

13.802***

13.562***

13.770***

13.528***

13.800***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

306
0.002

306
0.004

306
0.005

1,836
0.158

1,836
0.161

OLS regressions. Robust pvalues in parentheses. In Columns 1 to 3, we restrict the analysis to Stage 1.
In Columns 4 and 5 we include all stages and we cluster the standard errors at the individual level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3: The decision to be manager: Probit regressions
Dep. Variable: Dummy equal to 1 if subject wants to be manager
Men
Women
All
Choice&Messages (T3)

(1)
0.056

(2)
0.270

(3)
0.891

(4)
-0.691*

(5)
-1.018**

(6)
-1.175**

(7)
-0.351

(8)
0.056

(9)
0.840*

(0.885)

(0.435)

(0.121)

(0.059)

(0.037)

(0.036)

(0.189)

(0.885)

(0.099)

0.067*

0.090**

0.184***

0.187***

0.125***

(0.076)

(0.026)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.000)

Performance
Age
STEM-bus-eco
Native

0.043

0.046

0.027

0.059

0.045

(0.213)

(0.197)

(0.701)

(0.461)

(0.241)

0.776

0.945

1.024**

1.320**

1.165***

(0.116)

(0.142)

(0.028)

(0.015)

(0.003)

-0.285

-0.705

-1.218*

-1.079

-0.691*

(0.542)

(0.236)

(0.092)

(0.158)

(0.099)

Leadership
big5-agree
Two women in group

0.937

0.772

0.750*

(0.148)

(0.105)

(0.061)

-0.097***

0.021

-0.025

(0.008)

(0.613)

(0.386)

-0.520

-0.276

-0.310

(0.379)

(0.530)

(0.348)

Female

-0.592**

-0.155

0.619

(0.024)

(0.700)

(0.254)

-0.747

-1.692**
(0.013)
-1.704
(0.225)
0.021**

186

Female x T3
Constant
Fem.+Fem.xT3=0
Obs.

1.620***
(0.000)

-0.753
(0.490)

0.795
(0.580)

1.465***
(0.000)

-1.116
(0.516)

-3.123
(0.169)

1.849***
(0.000)

(0.160)
1.620***
(0.000)
0.009***

121

121

110

83

83

76

204

204

Probit regressions. Robust pval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: The characteristics of self-selected managers

Age
Stem-bus-econ major
Native speaker
Past leadership role
Big 5 - Agreeableness

Men

Women

21.48
.74
.55
.87
26.9

21.16
.63
.65
.94
29.88

H0 : M=W
p-value
0.640
0.291
0.400
0.307
0.067

P-values are generated by double-sided tests of equality of means
for Age and Big 5 AI. p-values from single sided tests in parentheses.
For the remaining variables, we conducted Chi-square tests.
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Table A.5: Rank B worker’s likelihood of being promoted conditional on the angry emoticons
sent
Dep. Var: Rank B worker is promoted to Rank A in T3
Male Manager Female Manager
All
All
(RB -RA )lag
female worker
(Angry emoticons)lag

(1)
0.035***

(2)
0.047***

(3)
0.041***

(4)
0.041***

(0.005)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.286

0.052

0.198

0.259

(0.166)

(0.764)

(0.145)

(0.199)

-0.037

-0.060

-0.052*

-0.044

(0.245)

(0.145)

(0.055)

(0.187)

0.281***

0.280***

(0.001)

(0.001)

Female Manager
Female Manager x (Angry emoticons)lag

-0.029
(0.611)

Stage
Constant
Observations
Clusters

R2

-0.051

-0.002

-0.026

-0.026

(0.308)

(0.973)

(0.421)

(0.429)

0.598**

0.775***

0.553***

0.543***

(0.032)

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.002)

64
16
0.307

76
19
0.299

140
35
0.321

140
35
0.323

Estimates generated by linear probability models. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
Robust pval in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Messages received from Rank A workers

Male Manager
Female Manager
H0 : M=F
ttest p-value
[Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value]

Avg. number of messages of each type from Rank A workers over the 5 stages
Commitment to Jokes
Justification
Rank
Thankful Challenging
work hard
of performance request
2.187
.906
.125
.094
2.344
.656
2.132
.974
.316
.210
2.763
.868
0.883
0.893

0.949
0.986

0.172
0.103

0.345
0.319

0.423
0.385

0.514
0.600

Table A.7: Messages received from Rank B workers

Male Manager
Female Manager
H0 : M=F
ttest p-value
[Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value]

Avg. number of messages of each type from Rank B workers over the 5 stages
Commitment to Jokes
Justification
Rank
Thankful Challenging
work hard
of performance request
1.031
.812
.281
.562
.312
2.094
.868
.605
.553
.500
.553
2.684
0.666
0.797

0.531
0.231
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0.154
0.131

0.799
0.384

0.350
0.583

0.292
0.161

Figure A.1: Percentage of efficient rank allocations over time
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Figure A.2: Percentage of managers receiving at least one angry emoticon
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MENTORSHIP EXPERIMENT:
Stage 1 instructions are the same for all four treatments.
INSTRUCTIONS-STAGE 1
In Stage 1, you will engage in 7 rounds of a task. This task consists of correctly identifying
the letters and numbers in a picture. This is similar to the CAPTCHA procedure on many
websites. In order to earn money, you will have to correctly identify the letters and numbers
in the CAPTCHA and enter those on the screen. You will then have to press ”submit”
to submit your answer and move to the next CAPTCHA. In each round of Stage 1 of
the experiment, you will have 4 minutes to solve up to 20 CAPTCHAS. There will be
CAPTCHAs with 6 elements to identify and others with 8. Each round will have a different
number of 6-element and 8-element pictures for you to identify. This means some rounds
will be more challenging than others. The level of difficulty will be determined randomly
for each participant in this stage. Consequently, some people will face a greater number of
challenging rounds than others.
Please note that the CAPTCHAs may contain both letters and numbers. The letters are
all UPPERCASE and must be entered in uppercase to receive credit. Please make sure you
use the Caps Lock when you enter the letters. The numbers are from 1-9 (zero is excluded).
In each round, you will be paid as follows:
You can solve as many CAPTCHAs as you like but you will have to meet a certain
threshold to receive payment. If you correctly solve at least as many CAPTCHAs as the
threshold for a round, you will receive a payment of 2 ECUs for every correct CAPTCHA plus
a 20 ECU bonus. If you do not correctly solve enough CAPTCHAs to meet the threshold
requirement, you will receive 0 ECU for that round. Each of the 7 rounds will have a different
threshold and you will not know what the threshold is during a round. You will learn at the
end of each round whether you successfully met the threshold, but you will only learn what
the thresholds were at the conclusion of all 7 rounds. The thresholds will be set based on
performance of participants in prior sessions.
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At the end of this stage we will provide you with a history of all 7 rounds showing you
your performance and the required threshold for each. At the end of the experiment, two
rounds from this Stage will be randomly chosen for payment. You will receive separate
instructions for Stages 2 and 3 after you finish Stage 1 of the experiment.
Please press continue to take a look at the next screen for an example of the CAPTCHA
task. On the screen you will see the task summary and solve a practice CAPTCHA. You will
then have to press CONTINUE to start Stage 1. Please try the sample CAPTCHA to make
certain you understand how it works and then press continue so that the paying rounds can
begin. If you have any questions about the screen, please raise your hand and I will come to
you.
INSTRUCTIONS-STAGE 2 (MaxInfo treatment)
Stage 2 of the experiment is about to begin.
In this Stage, you will be randomly assigned the role of either “Mentor” or “Mentee”.
You will keep your role for the duration of Stage 2.
In Stage 2, the Mentor and the Mentee will perform separate tasks.
The Mentee will engage in 5 more rounds of the CAPTCHA task. In each round of Stage
2 of the experiment, the Mentee will have 4 minutes to solve up to 20 CAPTCHAS. The
rounds will again have varying numbers of have 6-element and 8-element pictures meaning
that rounds will vary in their level of difficulty.
While this is the same as in Stage 1, the way the Mentee gets paid is now different.
Mentees can now choose how they want to be paid. They can choose between what we
will call Payment Scheme A and Payment Scheme B.
Payment Scheme A: This scheme is the same as the one experienced in Stage 1. In
each round, the Mentee will have to meet a certain threshold to receive payment with the
threshold varying across rounds. If the Mentee meets the threshold for a particular round,
they will receive a payment of 2 ECU for every CAPTCHA they correctly solve + a bonus
of 20 ECU. If they don’t meet the threshold for a particular round, they will receive 0 ECU.
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Payment Scheme B: This scheme is slightly different. The Mentee can solve as many
CAPTCHAs as they like, and they will receive a piece rate payment of 2 ECU for every
CAPTCHA they correctly solve. They will not have to meet any threshold requirement to
receive these earnings, but they will also not be eligible to receive a bonus.
The Mentor will engage in 5 rounds of a puzzle-solving task. Each task consists of finding
a 4-letter word in a 6x6 matrix. The Mentor will receive a fixed wage of 60 ECU per round
for engaging in this task regardless of how many puzzles they solve. The Mentor will have
the opportunity to provide a recommendation to the Mentee regarding which payoff scheme
they might choose.
As a way of helping you understand payment schemes A and B and the nature of the
choice (Mentee) or recommendation (Mentor) you have to make, you can see now see on
your screens a table showing you what you would have earned in either scheme from stage
1 based on your performance and the thresholds.
You will also see on your screens the role, “Mentor” or “Mentee”, you have been assigned.
Those of you who are “Mentees” have a question on your screen regarding your preference
for choosing A over B.
Please answer the question and then press submit and we will continue with the instructions.
For the next 5 rounds, the Mentee will be matched with a different Mentor in each
round. While the mentee will not know the threshold required in a round to receive the
bonus under Payment Scheme A, the Mentor will have some information about the threshold
which will be in the form of a signal regarding what the threshold is and be able to provide
a recommendation to the mentee regarding which payment scheme to choose. The signal (S)
Mentors will receive will be based on the real threshold (T) in that round. The signal, S,
that they see will be a random draw from the range of [T-2, T+2].
•

If, for example, the Mentor sees a signal S=12 they know that it is drawn from

the range [T-2, T+2]. Consequently, they will know that the true threshold is somewhere
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between 10 and 14. This is because the signal of 12 could be equal to T+2, in which case
12=T+2, meaning that T=10. Or it could be 12=T-2, meaning that T=14. It could also
be equal to any value between those extremes. So, the actual threshold is somewhere in the
range [10, 14]. All numbers in that range are equally likely to be the true threshold.
•

Here is another example. Suppose that the Mentor receives a signal S=9 from the

range [T-2, T+2]. In this case, the true threshold is in the range is [7, 11]. This is because
the signal 9=T-2 gives T=11. And the signal 9=T+2 gives T=7. Hence the range [7, 11].
Such range means that the true signal that the participant faced could have been any number
between 7 and 11.
Before making a recommendation, if any, the Mentor will also see the Mentee’s average
number of CAPTCHAs correctly completed from Stage 1. The mentor-mentee pair may
also be shown some characteristic they have in common from the opening questionnaire.
The Mentor will also be shown the average answer of all mentees to the question they just
responded to of how likely they are to choose Payment Scheme A over Payment Scheme B.
After observing the information, the Mentor can choose to provide a recommendation
to the Mentee. If they choose to provide a recommendation, the Mentor will Recommend
which payment scheme, A or B, they think the Mentee should choose.
Sending a recommendation is costly for the Mentor. The cost is between 10 and 13 ECU
depending on the strength of the recommendation, which is on a scale from 1 to 4. If the
Mentor sends a recommendation of strength 1, he or she will have to pay a cost of 10 ECU. If
the Mentor sends a recommendation of strength 2, the cost for the Mentor will be 11 ECU.
If the chosen strength of the recommendation is 3, the Mentor will have to pay a cost of 12
ECU. Finally, if the chosen strength of the recommendation is 4, the Mentor will have a pay
a cost of 13 ECU.
The Mentor gets paid a bonus of 10 ECU if the Mentee follows their recommendation of
the Payment Scheme. This bonus is based only on whether the Mentee follows the recommendation, and not based on the Mentee’s final earnings when following the recommendation.
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Once the Mentee sees their Mentor’s recommendation (if any) and the strength of the
recommendation, the Mentee will have to choose payment scheme A or B before beginning
to solve the CAPTCHA puzzles. Again, Mentees will not be told the threshold during a
round, but they will be shown a record of all the thresholds used in each round after the
stage is completed. For this stage, for any round in which Mentees choose Payment Scheme
A, if any, they will only find out if they met the threshold after all 5 rounds are concluded.
Therefore, the earnings from this stage of the experiment are determined as follows:
• The Mentee gets:
– Under Payment Scheme A: 2 ECU per correct CAPTCHA + bonus of 20 ECU
(if threshold met).
– Under Payment Scheme B: 2 ECU per correct CAPTCHA (no bonus).
• The Mentor gets:
– Fixed wage + Bonus - Cost.
– (60 ECU) (10 ECU if recommendation followed) (10 to 13 ECU).
At the end of the experiment, two rounds from Stage 2 will be randomly chosen for
payment.
If you feel you understand the rules for this stage, please press the continue button on
your screen to begin the rounds for stage 2.
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INSTRUCTIONS-STAGE 2 (Baseline treatment)
Stage 2 of the experiment is about to begin.
In this Stage, you will engage in 5 more rounds of the CAPTCHA task. In each round
of Stage 2 of the experiment, you will have 4 minutes to solve up to 20 CAPTCHAS. The
rounds will again have varying numbers of have 6-element and 8-element pictures meaning
that rounds will vary in their level of difficulty.
While this is the same as in Stage 1, the way you get paid is now different.
You can now choose how you want to be paid. You can choose between what we will call
Payment Scheme A and Payment Scheme B.
Payment Scheme A: This scheme is the same as the one experienced in Stage 1. In each
round, you will have to meet a certain threshold to receive payment with the thres hold
varying across rounds. If you meet the threshold for a particular round, you will receive a
payment of 2 ECU for every CAPTCHA they correctly solve + a bonus of 20 ECU. If you
don’t meet the threshold for a particular round, you will receive 0 ECU.
Payment Scheme B: This scheme is slightly different. You can solve as many CAPTCHAs
as you like, and you will receive a piece rate payment of 2 ECU for every CAPTCHA
you correctly solve. You will not have to meet any threshold requirement to receive these
earnings, but you will also not be eligible to receive a bonus.
As a way of helping you understand payment schemes A and B and the nature of the
choice you have to make, you can see now see on your screens a table showing you what
you would have earned in either scheme from stage 1 based on your performance and the
thresholds.
You have a question on your screen regarding your preference for choosing A over B.
Please answer the question and then press submit and we will continue with the instructions.
You will have to choose payment scheme A or B before beginning to solve the CAPTCHA
puzzles. Again, you will not be told the threshold during a round, but you will be shown a
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record of all the thresholds used in each round after the stage is completed. For this stage,
for any round in which you choose Payment Scheme A, if any, you will only find out if you
met the threshold after all 5 rounds are concluded.
Therefore, the earnings from this stage of the experiment are determined as follows:
• Under Payment Scheme A: 2 ECU per correct CAPTCHA + bonus of 20 ECU (if
threshold met).
• Under Payment Scheme B: 2 ECU per correct CAPTCHA (no bonus).
At the end of the experiment, two rounds from Stage 2 will be randomly chosen for
payment.
If you feel you understand the rules for this stage, please press the continue button on
your screen to begin the rounds for stage 2.
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEADERSHIP EXPERIMENT:
INSTRUCTIONS: Choice & Messages treatment
General instructions
Thank you all for coming today. You are here to participate in an experiment. In addition
to a $10 participation fee, you will be paid any money you accumulate from the experiment.
You will be paid privately, by check, at the conclusion of the experiment.
The experiment will consist of six stages and the instructions will be provided separately
on your screen at the beginning of each stage. You will have the chance to earn money
in each stage of the experiment. Earnings during the experiment will be denominated in
Experimental Currency Units, or ECU. At the end of the session one stage of the experiment
will be randomly selected for payment and your earnings in that stage will be converted to
dollars at the exchange rate of $1 for 6 ECU. After participating in all the stages of the
experiment you will be asked to complete a brief questionnaire. You will then be paid the
money your earned in the selected stage of experiment.
This study has been reviewed and approved by the SMU Human Subjects Committee.
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an
experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules may be
asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.
Please read and sign the Consent Form that you found on your desk. Please raise your
hand if you have any question about any of the information on the Consent form. We will
proceed with the experiment once we have collected all signed consent forms.
[Collect consent forms. Start program. When everybody is on Screen 3, distribute Puzzle
Example]
PUZZLE EXAMPLE (Handout 1 )
During the experiment, you will engage in multiple rounds of a puzzle-solving task. Please
refer to the paper you have been given to see an example of the task. Each task consists
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of finding a 4-letter word in a 6x6 matrix. As you can see on the example you have been
given, the screen will be divided in two halves. On the left, you will see the matrix and on
the right, you will see a list of 40 words. Each puzzle has two words that appear on the list.
In order to earn money, you will have to identify one word per puzzle. Once you identify the
word, you will have to enter the number next to that word in the list. You will then have to
press “submit” to move to the next puzzle.
Please note that the word you are looking for can appear horizontally or vertically in the
matrix, following a forward direction. You should ignore words that are read backward or
diagonally. You should also ignore words that do not appear in the list.

Look at the example you have been given. In order to earn points, you would have to
find either the word “tide” or the word “kite” and enter the corresponding number. The
word “tide” appears vertically on the first column. The word “kite” appears vertically on
the sixth column.
Can you all see the two words in the puzzle? Raise your hand if you cannot see them.
Note that there are other words that you may identify in the matrix. For instance,
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the word “sale” [appears horizontally on the fifth row, but it reads backward] and the word
“bale” [appears diagonally]. These words would not be valid entries, since they either appear
backward or are not on the list. Remember that for an entry to be valid, it MUST be on
the list to the right of the matrix.
Can you all see the two words in the puzzle? Raise your hand if you cannot.
Do you have any questions or doubts about the puzzle-solving task?

Instructions for Stages 2 to 6 (Handout 2)
Stage 2 of the experiment is about to begin.
• In this stage and in the following 5 stages of the experiment you will be part of a
group, together with two other participants. One group member will assume the role
of Manager and the other two group members will assume the role of Worker.
• The manager gets a wage of 100 ECU. The main role of the manager is to decide which
worker will be rank A and which worker will be rank B in the group, in this stage of
the experiment.
• A Rank A worker gets a wage of 80 ECU. A Rank B worker gets 20 ECU.
• After the rank allocation, all members of the group will engage in a similar puzzle
task as in Stage 1 of the experiment. Each correctly solved puzzle generates 2 ECU
in addition to the initial wage. Moreover, each puzzle solved correctly by the Rank A
worker generated 2 ECU also to the manager.
• Therefore the earnings from this stage of the experiment are determined as follows:
– The Manager gets 100 ECU + 2 ECU per puzzle + 2 ECU per puzzle solved by
Rank A worker
– Rank A worker gets 80 ECU plus 2 ECU per puzzle
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– Rank B worker gets 20 ECU plus 2 ECU per puzzle
• Stages 3 to 6 will be identical to Stage 2. However, at the end of each stage of the
experiment, the Manager will be informed about the performance of Rank A and Rank
B workers and will have the chance to reassign ranks before the next stage begins, at
his or her discretion.
Please turn this page around to have a look at the screen that the Manager will see when
making the rank allocation decision.
The Manager will have to decide which worker will be Rank A and which worker will
be Rank B. After the Manager makes the allocation decision, each worker will be informed
about the Rank they have been assigned, either rank A or rank B.
After assigning ranks A and B to the workers, the Manager will have to send a message to
the Rank A worker and a message to the Rank B worker. The message chat box CANNOT be
left blank. In the chat box, the Manager can write anything he or she wishes to communicate
to each worker. After the Manager submits the individual messages, each worker will see
the message sent to him or her and will have to send a message back to the Manager.
The Manager will see the following screen and will have to send a message to each of the
two workers. As before, we are referring to the Manager as “Name 1” and the workers as
“Name 2” and “Name 3” but in the actual experiment the names of the three group members
will be displayed.
Each worker will see the message sent to him or her and will have to send a message back
to the Manager. In addition, the Rank B worker can send one or more angry faces to the
Manager to express their disapproval of the ranking decision. In particular, the Rank B’s
worker can send up to 5 angry faces to the Manager, as shown below.
Please turn this page to see the screen that Worker Bs and the Manager will see. Rank
B worker will see the following screen and will have to decide how many angry faces, if any,
he or she will want to send to the Manager. Rank B worker will also have to write a message
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in the chat box, in response to the Manager’s message. Rank A worker will see a similar
screen, except that he or she will not be able to send angry faces to the Manager.
The messages sent by the workers will be displayed to the Manager as shown in the screen
below before the next stage begins. [Please note that in this example there is no actual text
displayed in the Message Box.] In the example below, Rank B worker has sent 3 angry faces.
Remember that Rank B can send between 0 and 5 angry faces.

125

At the end of each of the next 5 stages of the experiment, the Manager will have to decide
whether to keep or re-allocate ranks A and B to the two workers, at his or her discretion. The
Manager will also have to send messages to Rank A and Rank B worker before the beginning
of each stage of the experiment, and the workers will have to reply to those messages. At
the beginning of each stage, the Rank B workers will also have to decide whether to send
angry faces to the Manager.
Is the role of the Manager clear? Please raise your hand if you have any questions about
the next 5 Stages of the experiment.
In the next screen, you will be asked whether you want to be the Manager of your
group.
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